Pricing to market when exchange rate changes and output level matters by Seo, Ok-Sun, 1975-
 PRICING TO MARKET  
WHEN EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES  
AND OUTPUT LEVEL MATTERS 
                                 
 
 A Dissertation  
  presented to  
the Faculty of the Graduate School 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
by 
OK-SUN SEO 
Dr. Joseph H. Haslag, Dissertation Supervisor 
MAY 2006 
 
 
 
 

 ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
This dissertation is a result of supports from people who encouraged and helped 
me in many ways to complete the work. The first step toward learning is always hard, and 
it could not have been possible without the support and guidance.   
First and foremost, my sincere appreciation goes to my dissertation adviser, Dr. 
Joseph H. Haslag, for his exceptional encouragement and guidance through this work. I 
also would like to thank my other committee members, Dr. Ronald Ratti, Dr. Van Pham, 
Dr. Xinghe Wang, and Dr. John Howe for their helpful comments and suggestions.  
I appreciate the friendships of my fellow graduate students who accompanied me 
on my journey through graduate school. My thanks also go to the assistance of the office 
staff in the economics department. I am indebted to the Columbia Korean Baptist church 
members, especially pastor Chang Y. Lee and the bible study group members for their 
prayers and encouragement.   
I also would like to express my deep gratitude to professor Byong-Hyong Bahk 
at Dong-A University. He has led me to the joy of studying economics and is a wonderful 
mentor and model as an economist.   
 I am deeply grateful to my family with deepest appreciation to my parents and 
parents-in-law. They deserve all the credit and gratefulness for their endless love and 
support. I have been blessed to have my wonderful husband Min-Hong Oh, who has 
stood by me with unconditional support, understanding and love. He has kept me going 
and showed faith in me in times of difficulties. I cannot thank him enough. 
 iii
 Above all, I express my all thankfulness to God in all remembrance of his grace 
and love.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.…………………………………………….………………….ii 
ABSTRACT.….………………………………………………….…….………………..vii 
Chapter 
 1.  INTRODUCTION.……………………………………………….…..…………..1 
1.1  Pricing to Market: A Definition 
1.2  Alternative Definitions of PTM 
1.3  Roles of PTM in International Markets 
 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………….……………………10 
2.1  Different Terms in International Trade 
2.2  Pricing to Market: Krugman’s Definition 
2.3  Other Definitions of PTM 
2.4  Reasons for PTM 
 2.4.1  Market Segmentation 
2.4.2 Invoice Currency 
2.4.3 Demand Side Explanation 
2.4.4 Supply Side Explanation 
2.5  Empirical Test of PTM     
   3.  THE MODEL……………………………………………………………………38 
3.1  Assumptions 
3.2  The Model  
3.3  Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
 v
3.4 On PTM 
 3.4.1  Firm A’s Local-Currency Export Price vs. Firm A’s Domestic Price 
 3.4.2  Firm B’s Local-Currency Export Price vs. Firm B’s Domestic Price 
3.5 PTM and Invoice Currency 
 3.5.1  Firm A’s Export Price in Terms of its Own Currency vs. Firm A’s     
       Domestic Price 
 3.5.2  Firm B’s Export Price in Terms of its Own Currency vs. Firm B’s     
          Domestic Price 
 3.5.3  The Effect of The Invoice Currency on PTM            
3.6 Price Sensitivity to The Exchange Rate Movements in Country A 
3.7 Price Sensitivity to The Exchange Rate Movements in Country B 
3.8 Summary 
 4.  TWO-PERIOD MODEL………………………………………………………..71 
4.1  Assumptions 
4.2  Two-period Model 
4.3 Output Level and Discount Factor 
4.4 The Price and Discount Factor 
4.5 Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
4.6 On PTM 
 4.6.1  Firm A’s Local-Currency Export Price vs. Firm A’s Domestic Price 
 4.6.2  Firm B’s Local-Currency Export Price vs. Firm B’s Domestic Price 
4.7  Summary 
 5.  CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………..101 
 vi
REFERENCE LIST…….…………………………….………………………………..105 
VITA …………………………………………………………………………………. 108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii
PRICING TO MARKET 
WHEN EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES 
AND OUTPUT LEVEL MATTERS 
 
Ok-Sun Seo 
Dr. Joseph H. Haslag, Dissertation Supervisor 
 
ABSTRACT 
               
This dissertation clarifies the definition of Pricing to Market (PTM) and 
formalizes the definition. PTM in this paper focuses on the relative movements of prices 
in different markets, conditional on exchange rate movements. Therefore the degree of 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through (ERPT) itself is not important to determine the existence of 
PTM. But the relative degree of ERPT in different markets is crucial to conclude whether 
there is PTM behavior or not.  
This dissertation provides the bilateral trade model that determines the output 
levels of two countries endogenously relative to the exchange rate and the cost of 
production. And it considers the output level is the reason of PTM in the model economy. 
The model also suggests a standard to identify the existence of PTM based on the 
definition of PTM.  
I conclude that an incomplete ERPT is prevalent in the markets. Invoice currency 
has an effect on ERPT and PTM: Exporters pass through more exchange rate movements 
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to the export price -- higher degree of ERPT and the relative price difference between the 
domestic and the foreign market is larger -- higher degree of PTM when they invoice the 
export price in their own currency than they do in the buyers’ currency.  
In addition, I find that domestic producers produce more output levels and 
consumers buy more domestic goods in a country if the domestic seller and the exporter 
charge the same price and the price increases as the exchange rate fluctuates. I also show 
that a country has a surplus in the trade balance if the country’s currency depreciates. 
In the two-period model, I tried to examine the effect of extended time period on 
the output level, the price, ERPT and PTM. A firm’s output level, price, ERPT and PTM 
are affected by both its own discount factor and the other firm’s discount factor. I find 
that second-period ERPT is higher than the first-period ERPT. On the other hand, the 
effect of the extended time period on the PTM behavior is indeterminate in the model 
economy.           
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement, there has been a large 
increase in exchange rate volatility. Large U.S. dollar appreciations against the Japanese 
yen were observed, for example, in 1978-1984, 1988-1989, 1995-1998 and 2000-2002. 
The dollar depreciated sharply against the yen in the 1975-1978, 1985-1988, 1990-1995, 
1998-2000 and 2002-2004.1 In the international market, the exchange rate movement 
matters since it affects financial markets, the price of traded goods and the trade balance. 
The United States has been experiencing a trade deficit since 1971. It has been drastically 
increasing since 1997 and was recorded at about 724 billion dollars in 2005.2 In theory, 
the dollar depreciation allows the U.S. exporters to decrease the local-currency price in 
the foreign market and to sell more products, holding everything else constant. At the 
same time, it makes the foreign exporters charge higher dollar prices in the U.S. market 
and helps the U.S. consumers to buy fewer imports. As a result, the dollar depreciation 
improves the trade balance for the United States.3 However, the United States could not 
reduce the large deficit despite the relatively long period of the dollar’s depreciation since 
1990. The U.S. economists paid attention to the import price and export price movements 
as the exchange rate varied. The U.S. dollar price of imports from Japan, for instance, did 
not decrease as much as the exchange rate changes during the period in which the dollar 
                                                 
1 See Economist, “The passing of the buck?,” December 4: 71-73, 2004, Engel (1999), Dornbusch (1987), 
and Goldberg and Knetter (1997). 
2 Data Source: U. S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/historical/gands.txt 
3 Here, of course, we assume that the price elasticity of demand in the United States and in the foreign 
countries is relatively elastic. Thus the total revenue increases if the price decreases. And, the total revenue 
decreases if the price increases. 
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appreciated. Nor did it increase as much during the depreciation period (Froot and 
Klemperer, 1989; Marston, 1990; Knetter, 1993). The most glaring case, perhaps, is that 
some Japanese exporters decreased their price in the United States when there was a 34 
percent depreciation of the dollar against the yen between 1994 and 1995 (Goldberg and 
Knetter, 1997). Furthermore, researchers present evidence that the foreign exporters do 
price discriminate even more in the United States market than other markets as the 
exchange rate fluctuates, so that an import price in the U.S. responds less to the exchange 
rate changes compared to other countries (Hooper and Mann, 1989; Goldberg and 
Knetter, 1997). These phenomena also piqued economists’ interest in explaining why the 
exporters exhibit these pricing behaviors against the backdrop of the exchange rate 
movements.  
Krugman (1987) introduced the concept of Pricing to Market (PTM) in order to 
explain the relative price differences in different international goods markets when the 
exchange rate varies. This paper follows Krugman’s (1987) definition and will formalize 
PTM. I also investigate the existence of exporters’ PTM behavior using the model.  
 
 1.1 Pricing to Market: A Definition   
I define PTM in this paper as follows: PTM is an exporter’s behavior such that it 
charges relatively different prices in different markets in response to exchange rate 
fluctuations. As such, PTM focuses on the relative movements of the export price in 
different markets, conditional on exchange rate movements.  
For instance, let us suppose that a producer sells a product in foreign countries 
labeled A and B. The producer charges the export price in both foreign countries in 
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response to exchange rate movements. If the producer changes the export price in country 
A by the same proportion as the export price in country B relative to an exchange rate 
movement then there is no PTM behavior. Note that this definition does not depend on 
the export prices in countries A and B passing through the exchange rate movements. 
Given that there is an exchange rate increase, for example, if the proportion of the export 
price changes is very different in countries A and B, then the evidence indicates PTM 
behavior exists. Therefore, PTM behavior is not affected by whether the export price 
reflects the full proportion of the exchange rate movement or not. In other words, 
compared to the literature, PTM differs in that the degree of the exchange rate pass-
through to the price is not important. Rather, it is the similarity of the degree of the pass-
through in different markets that is crucial.  
The following is an equation that formalizes the notion of PTM. The numerator 
represents the exchange rate pass-through to the export price in country A and the 
denominator is the exchange rate pass-through in country B.   
 
 
%  in the export price in country A 
%  in the exchange rate  %  in the export price in country B
%  in the exchange rate
λ
Δ
Δ =Δ
Δ
                                                 (1.1) 
If 1λ =  then there is no PTM by an exporter. However, 1λ ≠  implies that PTM 
exists.   
 
To illustrate this point, suppose that the percentage change in the export price in 
country A is 1 percent and the percentage change in the exchange rate between the 
exporter’s country and country A is 2 percent, so that the exchange rate pass-through to 
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the export price in country A is 0.5 -- the numerator of the equation. Further, suppose that 
the percentage change in the export price in country B is 3 percent and the percentage 
change in the exchange rate between the exporter’s country and country B is 6 percent; 
then the exchange rate pass-through to the export price in country B is 0.5 -- the 
denominator of the equation. In this example, 1λ =  and there is no PTM by the exporter 
in countries A and B. In other words, if the exchange rate pass-through in countries A and 
B are exactly the same, then PTM is not present. And we could have no PTM even 
though we have incomplete exchange rate pass-through in the markets. 
To illustrate the relationship between PTM and complete exchange rate pass-
through, I consider another specific example. Suppose the denominator of equation (1.1) 
is one. Then, the numerator has to be one in order to conclude that there is no PTM in 
these countries. With one for the numerator or denominator, there is complete exchange 
rate pass-through to the export price in the country. This illustration makes the difference 
clear; in two countries, if both follow complete exchange rate pass-through, then there is 
no PTM. However, no PTM does not always imply complete exchange rate pass-through.  
 In conclusion, equation (1.1) formalizes the notion of PTM. In this dissertation, I 
will present a model in which the parameter space identifies whether PTM is satisfied or 
not.   
 
1.2 Alternative Definitions of PTM  
Researchers frequently implicitly or explicitly treat PTM as equivalent to 
incomplete Exchange Rate Pass-Through (ERPT). For example, Froot and Klemperer 
(1989) considered that PTM occurs when exporters increase the export price in dollars 
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during the period of the temporary appreciation of the dollar, instead of decreasing the 
dollar price. Alternatively, Falk and Falk (2000), Ghosh and Wolf (1994), Knetter (1993) 
and Goldberg and Knetter (1997) have called pricing behavior PTM if the exporters did 
not pass through all the exchange rate changes to the export price; more specifically, if 
the exporters use markups to reduce the effect of the exchange rate changes on the export 
prices.4  
Identifying what is PTM is the fundamental task. Then one can proceed to 
examine the existence of PTM and to account for the reasons that PTM behavior exists 
among exporters.  
 
1.3 Roles of PTM in International Markets  
Why does PTM matter? Why do we need a clear definition of PTM? What kinds 
of advantages do we get from studying PTM?  
There are four insights gained from applying a single definition of PTM. First of 
all, it becomes easier to identify PTM with a single approach. We can avoid any 
confusion that is associated with various or ambiguous definitions of PTM.   
Second, we will better understand the characteristics of the international goods 
market. It is easy to think that there is no PTM if exporters do not have any market power 
over the price. However, the definition of PTM in this dissertation addresses that we 
could have no PTM even though exporters have market power. For example, let us say 
that exporter K’s exchange rate pass-through in country A is 0.1 and the exchange rate 
pass-through in country B is 0.1 so 1λ = . And exporter Y’s exchange rate pass-through 
in country A is 1 and the exchange rate pass-through in country B is 1 thus 1λ =  as well. 
                                                 
4 This dissertation presents the definitions of PTM in other research more specifically later in chapter 2.  
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In this example, the degree of PTM for exporter K and exporter Y are the same; there is 
no PTM by these two exporters in both countries, A and B. Exporter Y passes through all 
the exchange rate movements to the export price in countries A and B and did not use any 
markup to mute the exchange rate fluctuations. On the other hand, exporter K exhibits 
market power in countries A and B passing through a low degree of ERPT in these 
countries. Thus, it is possible that no PTM occurs even though the exporters do have 
market power and markups because they can have the same low degree of ERPT in the 
markets as we have in the example above. 
Third, PTM gives us information about the patterns of exporters’ pricing behavior 
as the exchange rate changes in various international markets. If there are relative price 
differences in different markets as the exchange rate fluctuates, it is useful to know how 
different the price is and how persistent the difference is. A single definition of PTM 
provides a better perspective because it allows us to measure the relative price changes in 
the markets and the degree of PTM --λ .  
Fourth, we may better understand the price movements of the goods in some 
countries. Since PTM measures the relative price differences, the choice of countries that 
the exporter sells the product to is important when we investigate the existence of PTM. 
It is possible that the same producer exercises PTM in countries A and B, for example, 
but not in countries A and C for the same product. Thus, the single definition of PTM 
makes it possible to get country-specific or industry-specific information about the price 
differences and the price movements.  
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This dissertation makes the following contributions to the existing research: First, 
the paper clarifies the situation that we can consider as the existence of exporters’ PTM 
behavior.  
Second, I examine PTM behavior by specifying a model economy. My aim is to 
determine output levels endogenously as a function of the exchange rate and unit cost of 
production instead of taking the output levels exogenously as the reason of PTM. In this 
way, I extend the basic model by Froot and Klemperer (1989). 
Third, I show that both equilibrium domestic price and export price depend on the 
exchange rate and the cost of production in the model economy. This approach extends 
the work in which only export prices vary according to the exchange rate movements. 
The chief implication is that the exchange rate elasticity of domestic price and the 
exchange rate elasticity of export price are directly derived in the model. Therefore, it is 
also possible to directly measure the relative price changes as the exchange rate varies in 
the different markets. 
Fourth, I develop a standard that identifies the existence of PTM behavior 
displayed by exporters. As defined above, the standard is a ratio of the exchange rate 
elasticity of a country’s export price to the exchange rate elasticity of the domestic price. 
Here, I use the export and domestic prices determined in the model economy. The ratio 
offers a better measure of the relative price movements in the foreign market and the 
domestic market as the exchange rate fluctuates. The elasticity of the export price or that 
of the domestic price with respect to the exchange rate changes measures the percentage 
changes of the prices in response to the percentage changes of the exchange rates. In 
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other words, the ratio measures the relative price movements related to the exchange rate 
changes in the domestic market and the foreign market.  
Fifth, I present a different result from existing research about the relationship 
between the invoice currency and ERPT (Bacchetta and Wincoop, 2002), and between 
the invoice currency and PTM (Gil-Pareja, 2003 and Bleaney, 1997). I found that 
exporters pass through more exchange-rate movements to the export price when they 
charge the export price in their own currency than they do in the buyers’ currency. The 
relative price difference between the domestic and the foreign market is larger -- higher 
degree of PTM when they invoice the export price in their own currency than they do in 
the buyers’ currency. 
Sixth, I extend the model into a two-period model and investigate the influence of 
extended time periods on the output level, the export and domestic prices, ERPT and 
PTM. A firm’s output level, price, ERPT and PTM are affected by both its own discount 
factor and the other firm’s discount factor. I found that firms pass through more exchange 
rate movements to the price when they have more time horizon to consider; second-
period ERPT is higher than the first-period ERPT. However, the effect of extended time 
horizon on the PTM behavior is ambiguous in the model economy. I address the 
conditions of each firm’s discount factor that entail a higher future output level and 
higher price than the present output level and price.  
The rest of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 of the dissertation reviews the 
relevant literature related to PTM. Chapter 3 specifies the one-period model economy. 
The model provides the condition that measures ERPT and PTM behavior. In Chapter 4, I 
develop a two-period model and present the effect of extended time horizon on the output 
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level, the price, ERPT and PTM. Chapter 5 summarizes the preliminary findings of the 
models and suggests forward consideration for future studies. 
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        CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 I will review the relevant literature behind Pricing to Market (PTM) in this 
chapter. First of all, I want to point out the differences among Law of One Price (LOP), 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), Exchange Rate Pass-Through (ERPT) and Pricing to 
Market (PTM) in order to better understand PTM. Secondly, I review the definitions of 
PTM in other papers to make clear the differences between those authors’ definitions and 
the definition of PTM that I use in this paper. Third, different reasons for PTM will be 
reviewed. Fourth, I present a review of the existing empirical work on PTM.         
 
2.1 Different Terms in International Trade 
According to the Law of One Price (LOP), the price of a good in the United States 
should be the same as the price of the product in other countries in the world after we 
account for the exchange rate. Of course, the theory assumes that there is no transactions 
cost.         
If the LOP holds as the exchange rate changes for the products in two countries -- 
for instance, the United States and Japan -- we can say that we have Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) between these two countries.  
In the case of Exchange Rate Pass-Through (ERPT), pass-through measures the 
proportion of the exchange rate changes that is reflected in the export prices. So, the full 
proportion of the exchange rate pass-through is required to make LOP and PPP hold as 
the exchange rate changes. Indeed, many papers tested whether the LOP or PPP holds 
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using data for many products and industries (Isard, 1977; Engel and Rogers, 1996; 
Rogoff, 1996; Rush and Husted, 1985 and Patel, 1990). Generally, the findings show that 
the LOP or PPP does not hold in the real world and the result of the test varies across 
industries and countries. Even admitting the existence of the transactions cost, 
transactions cost does not account for the differences in product prices across countries as 
the exchange rate changes violating the LOP and PPP.  
Currently, many economists agree that it is not a surprising fact that exporters do 
not pass through the exchange rate changes to the export prices completely as the 
exchange rate varies (Frankel, Parsley and Wei, 2005; Lee, 1997; Menon, 1996; Gron 
and Swenson, 1996; Hooper and Mann, 1989; Froot and Klemperer, 1989 and Krugman, 
1987). Pricing to Market (PTM) extends exporter’s pricing behavior beyond incomplete 
ERPT and violation of LOP and PPP in the international goods market. In other words, in 
PTM, it does not matter whether the export price reflects the full proportion of the 
exchange rate changes or not. However, PTM focuses on an exporter’s price 
discrimination in different markets in response to the exchange rate fluctuations. For 
instance, if an exporter passes through 20 percent of the exchange rate changes to the 
export price of the product in country A and also passes through 20 percent of the 
exchange rate changes to the export price in country B, then there is no PTM behavior. 
On the other hand, ERPT is not complete and the LOP and PPP do not hold in this case. 
Namely, PTM values the relative movements of the export price in different markets as 
the exchange rate varies. 
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2.2 Pricing to Market: Krugman’s Definition 
 Krugman (1987) introduced the concept of exporter’s PTM behavior and I prefer 
to follow his definition of PTM. What he means by PTM is as follows:  
 
…the import price appears to fall “too little,” yet we would not want to call this a case of 
pricing to market. By contrast, suppose that BMW decides for some reason to keep both 
its dollar prices in the United States and its mark prices in Germany constant. In this case 
the price of BMWs will certainly not fall as much as the dollar rises, but that is not the 
distinctive point. What would be striking would be that prices of autos in Germany and 
prices of German exports to France would fall relative to export prices to the United 
States. Indeed, if the prices diverged far enough, there would be an incentive for 
individuals to bypass BMW’s distribution channels and creates a gray market. This is the 
situation that I have in mind when discussing pricing to market.5
 
In short, Krugman (1987) emphasizes that the relative price differences in 
different markets as the exchange rate fluctuates are important in order to call the 
situation as PTM. The export price itself that is not reflecting the full proportion of the 
exchange rate changes will not be considered as the case of the PTM.  
 
2.3 Other Definitions of PTM 
It is easy to use PTM together with incomplete exchange rate pass-through 
(ERPT) or violating the law of one price (LOP) implicitly without clarifying what is 
PTM. Most of the papers reviewed here use their own definition of PTM implicitly or 
explicitly. We can divide those definitions of PTM in other papers into two categories.  
First, most of the papers define the PTM as the situation that the export price does 
not reflect the full proportion of the exchange rate changes. Thus PTM equals the 
incomplete ERPT in those papers. Certainly, that is different from the definition of PTM 
in this paper and in Krugman’s (1987) paper. Ghosh and Wolf (1994) is a good example. 
                                                 
5 Krugman (1987), p. 51. 
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They consider that PTM occurs when the export prices do not compensate the nominal 
exchange rate movements and that PTM behavior induces incomplete ERPT. Thus, they 
basically equate PTM and incomplete ERPT. Froot and Klemperer (1989) also implicitly 
use the concept of PTM and incomplete ERPT to the export price as the same terms. The 
authors regard the pricing behavior as PTM when the exporters set the export price 
perversely to the exchange rate movements. For example, according to the authors, PTM 
occurs when exporters increase the export price in dollars during the period of the 
temporary appreciation of the dollar, instead of decreasing the dollar price. I will, 
however, consider that perverse price setting itself is not the PTM behavior in this paper 
as long as the exporter sets that perverse price setting on other markets as well.  
Indeed, Froot and Klemperer’s (1989) definition is appropriate if we assume that 
the domestic price is not changing at all according to the exchange rate changes.6 With 
this assumption, if the exporter passes through the full proportion of the exchange rate 
changes to the export price, then there will be no PTM. Moreover, the PPP is achieved 
and ERPT is completed between the domestic market and the foreign market. So, in this 
case, we can treat ERPT and PTM as the same thing. On the other hand, if the exporter 
does not pass through the full proportion of the exchange rate fluctuations or if the 
direction of export price movement is not corresponding with our expectation as the 
exchange rate changes, PTM occurs between these two countries. Again, in this situation, 
incomplete ERPT tells us that there is PTM. However, I could not find any of this 
assumption or explanation in the paper.     
                                                 
6 In the model I present later in this dissertation, both the domestic price and the export price vary based on 
the exchange rate as well as the cost of the production. I will suggest the ratio of the exchange-rate 
elasticity of export price to the exchange-rate elasticity of domestic price in order to examine whether there 
is PTM or not. Furthermore, the elasticity of the ratio represents ERPT to the domestic price and ERPT to 
the export price.      
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Similarly, Knetter (1989) defines PTM as exporters’ “destination-specific 
adjustment of markups” in different markets as exchange rate changes. The author calls it 
PTM if the exporters did not pass through all the exchange rate changes to the export 
price -- more specifically, if the exporters use markups to reduce the effect of the 
exchange rate changes on the export prices. Falk and Falk (2000) follow Knetter’s (1989) 
definition of PTM. Knetter (1993) also identifies the concept of “local currency price 
stability (LCPS)” in order to explain the exporter’s PTM behavior. According to Knetter 
(1993), exporters prefer to stabilize local currency prices instead of getting constant 
markups as the exchange rate changes and he calls this LCPS. Exporters, for instance, 
need to increase the local currency price when buyers’ currency is depreciated against 
sellers’ currency. The exporters, however, want to have the constant export price thus 
they do not increase the local currency price by decreasing the markups that they can 
earn. Thus, the author considers LCPS as a case of the exporters’ PTM behavior.  
In the second category, researchers use an unclear or a general definition of PTM. 
Marston (1990) calls the pricing behavior PTM when exporters decrease their own 
currency export price in the foreign market as their own currency appreciates in order to 
prevent too much increase in the buyers’ currency price of the goods. Interestingly, Betts 
and Devereux (2000) identify the PTM as follows: “Some firms segment markets by 
country, and set prices in local currency of sale, a practice we refer to as pricing-to-
market (PTM).” The authors develop a general equilibrium7 model that determines the 
exchange rate endogenously. They conclude that there will be no PTM if there is no price 
stickiness. In addition, PPP and LOP will be achieved without any price stickiness. Also, 
                                                 
7 Most of the research reviewed here is based on a partial equilibrium model to explain exporters’ PTM 
behavior and I will also develop the model in this paper in partial equilibrium perspective.  
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the authors remark that the exchange rate is more volatile when there is PTM. Lastly, Gil-
Pareja (2003) mentions PTM generally as “the existence of international price 
discrimination induced by exchange rate movements”. The paper does not identify the 
kind of price discrimination. 
  
2.4 Reasons for PTM 
The basic assumption economists make when research considers PTM is that the 
exporters have some market power in the international goods market, therefore exporters 
can adjust the prices in the different markets as the exchange rate changes. 
Krugman (1987) contributed the basic idea behind PTM empirically and 
theoretically but did not offer a rigorous treatment to explain PTM. After the introduction 
of the PTM, many efforts have been made to explain the reason for exporters’ PTM 
behavior by providing theoretical models and testing the existence of PTM empirically. 
Froot and Klemperer (1989), Kasa (1992), Knetter (1989), Knetter (1993), Marston 
(1990) and Goldberg and Knetter (1997) et al. are some of the good examples of the 
efforts. 
Gil-Pareja (2003) points out that there could be two major categories of reasons 
for PTM. Firstly, PTM occurs because of exporters’ strategic price discrimination. 
Exporters set different prices in different markets strategically in order to get more profits 
as the exchange rate moves. For instance, if we consider elasticity of demand, market 
share, adjustment costs and expectations of the exchange rate movements as the reasons 
for PTM then exporters’ strategic price discrimination is the explanation for the PTM.  
 15
Secondly, PTM occurs because of price rigidity. We observe PTM phenomena 
because of the time lag between the exchange rate fluctuations and exporters’ setting 
export prices based on the exchange rate movements. Thus, in this case, exporters do not 
really intend to have the price differences in different markets but actually will have the 
price differences in those markets when the exchange rate varies. The long-term contract 
practice (Bergin and Feenstra, 2001), the market segmentation or the choice of invoice 
currency could make the price-rigidity problem even worse in the international goods 
markets.         
The major trends in explaining the reasons for PTM rely on the exporters’ 
strategic price discrimination, such as demand side explanation and supply side 
explanation. Knetter (1989) and Knetter (1993) reflect those explanations: the effect of 
exchange rate changes on export prices will be caused by changes in marginal cost of 
production (supply side effect of exchange rate changes) and changes in markups which 
depend on the convexity of demand schedule (demand side effect of the exchange rate 
changes).  
Additionally, some economists, such as Krugman (1987), Froot and Klemperer 
(1989) and Kasa (1992), apply these two sides of explanation further involving exporters’ 
expectation of the exchange rate fluctuations: temporary or permanent exchange rate 
changes.      
 
 
 
 
 16
2.4.1 Market Segmentation 
Market segmentation as a cause of PTM suggests that it is not so surprising to 
have different prices in different markets if the markets are separated and we have 
different costs to provide the goods and different currencies in those markets.  
Goldberg and Knetter (1997) try to define the meaning of market segmentation 
and integration. The authors indicate that the market is segmented geographically if the 
consumers need to pay significant transactions cost or if there are trade disturbances 
caused by cultural differences, different requirements for the products or tariffs and so 
on. They agree that the international goods market is segmented and the segmented 
market creates market power for the sellers. And that market power gives the sellers the 
opportunity to charge different prices for the same products in different countries. The 
authors also consider that the source of the segmentation and market power could be 
trade barriers that are raised by “country- and industry-specific” reasons, border effect 
and distance effect created by geographical country borders and the distance between 
countries.8  
It is therefore possible that the sellers have more incentive to commit price 
discrimination in these segmented markets to get more profits, especially when the 
exchange rate fluctuation is enormous.  
Engel and Rogers (1996) assert that market segmentation is one of the reasons for 
violating LOP, and provide an interesting result that not only the border but both distance 
and the border are important to explain the relative price movements among countries. 
The authors found that exporters do take into account the availability of substitutes and 
                                                 
8 Such as tariff, trade frictions, transactions cost and different requirements for the products with different 
societal customs in different countries, etc. 
 17
competitive suppliers within some distance when they set the prices. Thus distance and 
the border take a role in exporters’ price setting, causing relative price differences in 
different markets. The authors also propose that exporters adjust their prices more 
frequently if they have more competitors in a nearby location.  
In other words, according to the authors, we observe the failure of LOP because 
the international goods markets are segmented by border and distance. Therefore the 
international market does not have many competitors and substitutes nearby and does not 
have a big incentive to adjust the price often. Thus, the price stickiness created by the 
market segmentation makes the price differences even worse.    
Moreover, Gil-Pareja (2003) found that the EU automobile market is a segmented 
market even after the “single market programme”, and that the existence of market 
segmentation factors likely plays a role as the force of price differences in the 
international market.       
 
2.4.2 Invoice Currency 
It is known that usually exporters predetermine export prices, do not change the 
export price frequently, and set the price in the sellers’ currency (Page, 1981 and 
Godburg and Knetter, 1989). It makes sense to assume that the selection of invoice 
currency could play an important role in PTM behavior as the exchange rate fluctuates.  
Gil-Pareja (2003) criticizes the fact that many papers ignore the role of invoice 
currency in PTM phenomena. He argues that the choice of invoice currency has even 
more effect on PTM and ERPT when the exporters do not change the export prices 
frequently based on the exchange rate movements. Giovannini (1988) argues that the 
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currency choice between the destination currency and the exporters’ currency is crucial to 
the price differences in different markets, especially when the exporters preset the export 
price. The author suggests that expectation of the exchange rate movements decides the 
expected profits, and that the expectation about the profits influences exporter’s pricing 
behavior such as invoice choices. Inversely, the choice of export price currency has a 
different impact on exporters’ profit based on the relationship between the exchange rate 
and the profit. In particular, in the model, Giovannini (1988) proves that “If profits are a 
concave function of the exchange rate, setting export price in foreign currency leads to 
higher expected profits. If profits are a convex function of the exchange rate, setting 
export price in home currency leads to higher expected profits.”9         
It is common that exporters state prices in exporters’ currency when they sell 
products in foreign countries. Japanese exporters, however, frequently invoice in dollars 
and exhibit severe PTM behaviors (Page, 1981 and Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). So, 
Bleaney (1997) pays attention to the fact that many Japanese exporters use the U.S. dollar 
as the invoice currency not only for the products to the U. S. but also for the products to 
other foreign markets. Because of this fact, Japanese exporters’ pricing behaviors are 
affected by the real value of the dollar and the real value of the yen. He points out 
Japanese exporters’ choice of the invoice currency as one of the reasons for the price 
differences between the foreign market and the domestic market when the exchange rate 
varies.  
After comparing the price difference between the dollar export price and the 
domestic price that Japanese exporters charge as the exchange rate changes, Bleaney 
(1997) concludes that in the short run, the price difference between the foreign market 
                                                 
9 Giovannini (1988), p. 51. 
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and the domestic market is relatively big when the yen appreciates against all other 
currencies. However, it is relatively small when the dollar appreciates against other 
currencies other than the yen. According to the author, this is because Japanese exporters 
decrease the dollar export price more when there is yen appreciation against other 
currencies than they do when there is dollar appreciation. Bleaney (1997) calls it “dollar-
invoicing effect.” In other words, Japanese exporters change the dollar export price less 
in foreign markets if there is real dollar value change than they do if there is real yen 
value change against other currencies. The dollar-invoicing effect could occur because of 
the time lag between the dollar price setting and delivery of the product. Moreover, there 
is the dollar-invoicing effect in the short run but not in the long run. Therefore, the PTM 
is not affected by the choice of invoicing currency in the long run.  
Gil-Pareja (2003) also investigates the role of invoice currency in PTM behavior. 
He tested European car producers’ PTM behavior related to choice of the invoice 
currency after “the single market programme”. Unfortunately, Gil-Pareja (2003) could 
not find strong evidence to support the important role of invoice currency to explain 
PTM. And he concludes that the different choice of invoice currency is not a factor to 
explain the PTM phenomenon in the EU car market.  
In contrast, Bacchetta and Wincoop (2002) found a strong relationship between 
the choice of invoice currency and ERPT. If exporters impose the export price in terms of 
buyer’s currency then there is zero ERPT. However, if exporters charge the export price 
in terms of seller’s currency then there is complete ERPT. And exporters choose the 
invoice currency based on the size of market share and how different the product is. If 
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exporters have larger market share and more differentiated goods, they tend to choose 
exporter’s currency instead of buyer’s currency.   
Magee (1973) analyzes how the choice of currency on contracts affects the trade 
balance. It is an interesting analysis, especially when we consider America’s growing 
trade deficit since 1971. The author presumes that there is a time lag between making 
contract and shipping the product. So, if there is exchange rate movement after the 
contract is made and before the product is shipped, the exchange rate fluctuation could 
have influence on the trade balance. The exchange rate represents the amount of dollar 
per unit of foreign currency. For simplicity, Magee considers the situation that the dollar 
depreciated. Magee introduces four possible cases, as follow, to examine the relationship 
between the invoice currency and the trade balance: first, U.S. exports in foreign currency 
and U.S. imports in dollars; second, U.S. exports in foreign currency and U.S. imports in 
foreign currency; third, U.S. exports in dollars and U.S. imports in dollars; and fourth, 
U.S. exports in dollars and U.S. imports in foreign currency. For example, if the U.S. 
producer exports the product charging the price expressed in foreign currency and the 
U.S. consumers buy imports in terms of dollars, then if the dollar depreciates, the value 
of the U.S. exports will be increased as the U.S. producers receive the same amount of 
revenue in foreign currency by selling their goods but get more revenue in dollars after 
the dollar depreciation. On the other hand, the value of the U.S. imports will stay the 
same in terms of dollars because consumers pay in dollars. As a result, U.S. trade balance 
rises as the dollar depreciates in this case.  
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2.4.3 Demand Side Explanation 
 The common story of the demand side cause of PTM is a price discrimination 
based on the changes of price elasticity of demand. Knetter (1989) and Knetter (1993) 
emphasize the relationship among the exchange rate, the changes of price elasticity of 
demand, Local Currency Price Stability (LCPS) and markups. If buyers’ elasticity of 
demand is increasing as price increases, then exporters will not increase local currency 
price as much as we expected in a very competitive model as buyers’ currency 
depreciates because exporters prefer not to face higher elasticity of demand. As the result, 
exporters keep the local currency price stable, namely allow LCPS and the decrease in 
their markups. Of course, we assume that marginal cost is constant.  
On the other hand, if buyers’ elasticity of demand is decreasing as price increases, 
exporters will increase local currency price more than they do in the case of increasing 
elasticity of demand but less than they do in a competitive model as buyers’ currency 
depreciates. This is because exporters will face decrease in the elasticity of demand as 
they increase the price. It means that the consumers are less responsive to the price 
changes as the price increases. As the result, exporters allow the increase in their markups 
in this case by allowing LCPS.10  
Finally, as Froot and Klemperer (1989) also mention the exchange rate changes 
would be fully passed through to export prices in the case of constant elasticity of 
demand, and there is no LCPS if elasticity of demand is constant in Ketter (1993). 
Furthermore, Krugman (1987) points out the importance of both reputation and 
time lag in studying the effect of price on demand. He argues that: it will take time to see 
                                                 
10 As I explain earlier in this chapter, Knetter (1993) is treating LCPS as the same as exports’ PTM 
behavior. 
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the effect of export price changes on demand when the price changes due to exchange 
rate changes. In addition, Krugman assumes that there exist trade-offs between today’s 
profit and future market share, meaning if exporters want to get more market share in the 
future, it is necessary to sacrifice today’s high profit.  
On the consumer’s side, Krugman assumes that, first of all, consumers decide 
whether they will enter a particular goods market or not, considering both the price and 
the expected price, where the expected price depends on the firm’s reputation. They then 
choose whether to buy the good, as well as the quantity they want to buy if they decide to 
buy. The number of consumers that actually enter a firm’s market depends on the 
expected price of the good. After consumers decide to enter a goods market, a firm will 
have a less elastic demand curve,11 and will face an incentive to change the actual price 
from the expected price of consumers; if an exporter follows this incentive, however, it 
will lose market share because consumers will not believe the firm in the future. Thus, an 
exporter will have a smaller market share, and a smaller profit, in the future. 
As a result, an export firm must first take into account whether exchange rate 
movements are temporary or not. Secondly, an exporter considers the trade-off between 
today’s profit and the market share in the future when he sets the export price as the 
exchange rate varies. 
 Froot and Klemperer (1989) also start with the assumption that there exist trade-
offs between today’s profit and future market share. Thus, a foreign exporter invests in 
market share using the current export price. According to the authors, when a foreign 
exporter believes that an appreciation of the dollar is temporary, there could be an inter-
temporal substitution, that is, an exporter will prefer to get a high current dollar profit 
                                                 
11 Because of brand switching costs and network externalities, etc. 
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rather than invest in market share for the future by increasing, rather than decreasing, the 
dollar export price in the U.S. market. However, in the case of permanent dollar 
appreciation, an exporter will prefer to get a larger market share in the U.S. market in the 
future by decreasing the current dollar export price, rather than take the current dollar 
profit expressed in the exporter’s currency. In other words, the second-period profit 
depends on first-period market share that is determined by the current price. Since first-
period market share determines second-period market demand12 and second-period 
market demand decides second-period profit, Froot and Klemperer (1989) set the current 
market share as one of the independent variables in the model and introduce “cost 
effects” and “real interest rate effects” to investigate the effect of the exchange rate 
changes on the export price. 
 Formally, the domestic firm’s discounted future profit, denoted by a superscript 
D, expressed in dollars, is:  
 ( ) ( )( )1 2,D D D F D D D D F 2, ,p p pπ π λ π σ= + p e ,                                                (2.1) 
where the total profits are the sum of the first- and second-period profits, 1 2and 
D Dπ π  
respectively.  Note that ,D Fp p denotes the domestic firm’s and the foreign firm’s first-
period prices, respectively. Second-period profits depend on the first- and second-period 
market share. Dλ  is a discount factor, Dσ  is first-period market share, expressed as a 
function of the domestic and foreign price of a good, and  is the number of the foreign 2e
                                                 
12 The authors say that second-period demand depends on first-period market shares because of consumers’ 
brand-switching costs, brand loyalty and network externalities. See Froot and Klemperer (1989), p. 639 and 
Klemperer (1987). 
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currency over a dollar in the second period. The idea is that the first-period investment in 
market share can affect second-period demand. 
 The foreign firm’s total discounted future profit, denoted by πF, expressed in its 
own currency, is: 
( ) ( )( )1 1 1 2 2 2, , , ,F F D F F F D Fe p p e e p p eπ π λ π σ= + .                                         (2.2) 
 
The discount factor is given by: 
 
1
i
ir
βλ = + ,         ,                                                                              (2.3) ,i D F=
where β , is the duration of the second period relative to the first, and interest rate in 
the  country, respectively.  
ir
i
 The authors hold the interest rate constant in the foreign firm’s home market, 
therefore hold Fλ  constant as follows:  
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1
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e
λ λ λ= ⋅ =                                                                                           (2.4) 
 
The assumptions are given by13: 
i) F has constant marginal costs, Fγ in terms of foreign currency and 1
1
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π∂ >∂ ,   ,i D F= . 
                                                 
13 Froot and Klemperer (1989), p. 640. 
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Froot and Klemperer find firm i ’s price in reduced form from taking total differentiation 
of the first order condition of each country’s profit function with respect to 1 2,  or 
F Fc c λ  is: 
( 1 2, ,i i F Fp p c c )λ= ,                                                                                         (2.5)       
“the effect of a proportional change in the period-t exchange rate” is: 
 
Fi i i
t
F
t t t
dcdP P P d
de c de det
λ
λ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎛ ⎞∂ ∂= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞⎟⎠
                                                               (2.6) 
              =  cost effects  +  real interest rate effects.  
 The important contribution of this paper is that the authors divide the effect of 
exchange rate changes on price of goods into cost effects and real interest rate effects 
when market share matters.  
 Those cost effects and real interest rate effects can be specified into first-period 
and second-period as follows: “the effect of current, temporary and proportional 
appreciation of the domestic currency” is: 
 1
1 1
i i
F
F
dP P Pc
de c
λ
i
λ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎟
                                                                          (2.7) 
                    = cost effects  +  real interest rate effects. 
 
“the effect of a future proportional appreciation” is: 
 2
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λ
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                                                                          (2.8) 
                    = cost effects  +  real interest rate effects.  
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“the effect of a permanent percentage change in the exchange rate(i.e., de1=de2)” is:  
 1 2
1 2 1 2
i i i i
F F
F
dP dP P Pc c
de de c c
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂+ = − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠F ⎟
.                                                             (2.9) 
Result 1 (Froot and Klemperer): Cost effects on the price changes; according to the 
authors, cost effects force  to decrease, as the expectation of future exchange rate 
increases and cost effects on 
FP
DP  is indeterminate.  
Result 2 (Froot and Klemperer): An appreciation of the dollar decreases F’s dollar costs, 
2
2
F
Fc
e
γ= .  Because of the decrease in dollar cost in the future, marginal value of first-
period market share is increasing and that increased value of the market share will 
increase second-period profit, 2
F
F
π
σ
⎛ ⎞∂⎜ ∂⎝ ⎠⎟
. Hence, firm F will decrease  to invest in 
market share and to get higher second-period profit when there is a decrease in second-
period dollar cost as the exchange rate increases. Thus, 
FP
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Result 3 (Froot and Klemperer): Real interest rate effects on prices changes; real interest 
effects make  rise as the exchange rate increases temporarily. From equation (2.4), iP λ  
decreases with an increase in . The lower 1e λ , discount factor, means the higher cost of 
the second-period investment, so firm F prefers to invest less in the second-period by 
getting less market share in first-period and getting less first-period profit by increasing 
current price. As the result, the marginal value of price in first-period, 1
i
iP
π⎛ ⎞∂⎜ ∂⎝ ⎠⎟ , decreases. 
Therefore, 0
iP
λ
⎛ ⎞∂ <⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
 ⇒  0
iPλ λ
⎛ ⎞∂ <⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
 or 0
iPλ λ
⎛ ⎞∂− >⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
.                                                                             
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Result 4 (Froot and Klemperer): Temporary dollar appreciation and exchange rate pass-
through and PTM; from equation (2.7), we have cost effects, 1
1
0
i
F
F
Pc
c
⎛ ⎞∂− <⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
 and real 
interest rate effects, 0
iPλ λ
⎛ ⎞∂− ⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
> , thus if real interest rate effects dominate cost effects 
under temporary dollar appreciation, then the price of goods will increase instead of 
decreasing. Therefore, this model can explain hysteresis of import prices in the United 
States in 1980s with exchange rate changes. In this case, authors consider that PTM also 
occurs. 
Result 5 (Froot and Klemperer): Temporary and permanent exchange rate changes and 
exchange rate pass-through; when we compare equations (2.7) and (2.9), a foreign firm 
lowers its dollar price more when it expects that the exchange rate change is permanent 
than it does when it expects that the exchange rate is temporary. This is because there are 
only negative cost effects in the case of permanent exchange rate changes in equation 
(2.9) and there are negative cost effects and positive real interest rate effects in the case 
of temporary exchange rate changes in equation (2.7). 
In summary, according to Froot and Klemperer (1989), when a foreign exporter 
believes that an appreciation of the dollar is temporary, the appreciation of the dollar 
increases the value of the current dollar profits expressed in the exporter’s currency. 
Thus, an exporter will prefer to get a high current dollar profit rather than invest in 
market share for the future. An exporter will increase the dollar export price ( in the 
U.S. market in the situation of the temporary appreciation of the dollar, instead of 
decreasing the dollar price. However, in the case of permanent dollar appreciation, an 
exporter will prefer to get a larger market share in the U.S. market in the future rather 
)FP
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than take the current dollar profit expressed in the exporter’s currency. Therefore, an 
exporter will decrease the current export price ( as quoted by the dollar. )FP
Krugman (1989) also introduces a two-period model to conduct a dynamic 
analysis of PTM as well but he could not get a clear conclusion about the temporary and 
permanent effect on export prices. The profit function -- expressed in terms of the foreign 
firm’s currency -- of a firm that sells a commodity in the U.S. market in two periods is: 
 ( )*1 1e P c− ( ) ( ) ( )*1 1 2 2 2 1 2, ,D P e P c D P Pβ+ −  
where ( )1 1D P , ( )2 2D P  is a first- and second-period demand respectively. * *
1 2
,c c
e e
 is the 
foreign firm’s marginal cost in dollars, and β  is a discount factor. In Krugman (1989), 
the first-period demand function depends on the first-period price but second-period 
demand depends on the first-period price and the second-period price.  is a foreign 
firm’s currency price over a dollar.  
1e
 To examine the effect of the expectation of exchange rate changes -- temporary or 
permanent -- on the export price, the author compares two cases, the effect of the  only 
on  -- when the exporter expects the exchange rate change is temporary -- and the 
effect of the  and  on  -- when the exporter expects the exchange rate change to be 
permanent. Krugman questions: which view -- that is, whether the exchange rate 
movements are temporary or permanent -- will decrease the current export price more? 
He concludes that the impact of temporary and permanent exchange rate on the export 
prices is ambiguous. 
1e
1P
1e 2e 1P
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2.4.4 Supply Side Explanation 
For simplicity, most papers assume that marginal cost of production is constant. 
As the exchange rate varies, they investigate the effect that such movements will have on 
export prices. Knetter (1989) follows the same assumption, but admits that changes in the 
marginal cost of production occur over time. He attempts to distinguish changes in 
marginal cost induced over time from fluctuations in the markups caused by exchange 
rate changes empirically, in order to measure the net markup fluctuations that represent 
exporters’ price discrimination across the destination markets as the exchange rate varies. 
Krugman (1987) and Kasa (1992) identify the adjustment cost that is another 
factor. Kasa (1992) argues that the adjustment cost model explains an exporter’s PTM 
more precisely than the demand-side analysis, which relies on the shape of the demand 
curve, market share, switching costs, brand loyalty, etc. in order to explain PTM, since 
adjustment costs is a more direct and intuitive factor affecting an export price in response 
to exchange rate movements.  
Both authors suggest that the adjustment cost could be the additional factor that 
results because exporters expand overseas quickly or contract their product quantities. 
More specifically, Krugman (1987) identifies that marketing and distribution costs are 
more reasonable to consider as adjustment costs rather than transportation costs.   
 Krugman (1987) and Kasa (1992) note that if a firm decreases the export price as 
measured in buyers’ currency as much as buyers’ currency appreciation against 
exporter’s currency, the firm will face an increase in demand in a foreign export market. 
However, increasing the supply immediately causes adjustment costs for a firm. 
Therefore, if a firm believes that the exchange rate change is temporary, it will maintain 
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the export price, or decrease the export price less than that implied by the exchange rate 
appreciation. Thus, a firm will not face a large increase in demand, allowing it to avoid a 
large supply increase, along with the endogenous change in adjustment costs. It is not 
worth paying adjustment costs to meet the temporary demand increase if the exchange 
rate movements are temporary. In this instance, a firm pursues PTM behavior if it 
believes the exchange rate fluctuation is temporary, using its static markups to smooth the 
temporary exchange rate changes.  
In the case of permanent dollar appreciation, however, a firm will decrease the 
dollar export price and pay adjustment costs to increase the supply. Thus, the 
maintenance of an exporter’s PTM behavior is determined not only by how long the 
exchange rate fluctuation has lasted, but also by the exporter’s expectation of the 
persistence of exchange rate fluctuations.  
Overall, Froot and Klemperer (1989) and Kasa (1992) propose dynamic analyses 
of PTM. Indeed, each sets of results share a similar spirit: a temporary appreciation of the 
dollar has a smaller effect on the export price than a permanent appreciation of the dollar. 
Thus, the exporter’s PTM behavior can be observed when there is an expectation of 
temporary exchange rate changes.  
Similar to the literature on adjustment costs, Ghosh and Wolf (1994) view menu 
cost as the reason that accounts for PTM and for incomplete ERPT. If a frequent price 
change incurs significant menu costs, the exporters will not reflect the exchange rate 
movements on the export price completely.   
In contrast, Baldwin (1988) insists that the effect of the temporary exchange rate 
changes could have a permanent effect through the structure changes of economy on 
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import prices; more specifically, “hysteresis14 in import prices.” The structural changes 
will be induced since a large appreciation of domestic currency will decrease the foreign 
cost in terms of domestic currency and will attract other firms to enter the industry and 
the firms will face more competition.15 Competition will lower the import price. So, even 
though the temporary appreciation is eliminated, firms will keep the price lower than they 
would have.  
 
2.5 Empirical Test of PTM 
The most serious problem in testing PTM explanations empirically is that there is 
lack of data available to measure a country’s export and domestic prices across industries. 
Alternatively, it is hard to get the data that measure export prices of the same product in 
different export markets. Most commonly, unit values of aggregate price indices are used 
to do the empirical analysis, even though it cannot represent the exact export price or 
domestic price of a commodity.  
Knetter (1993) chose large economies as the destination of exports to get more 
observations and to obtain more accurate unit value data -- total value of exports divided 
by the total quantity. He intended to get industries in which more than one of the four 
countries exports the product to other countries in the sample. This is difficult, however, 
because the industry classification code is hard to match across the countries. Knetter 
(1989) uses detailed seven-digit industry export data measured in unit values. In Froot 
and Klemperer (1989), the authors use highly disaggregated bilateral export unit value 
                                                 
14 By this term, the author means, for example, that even though the temporary exchange rate shock is 
eliminated, the import price will not go back to the original level.  
15 Knetter (1994) concluded that he could not find strong evidence that there was increased competition in 
the U.S. market as the dollar appreciated in large amount in the 1980s.  
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data from the U.N. to get a measure of the changes in export prices. Kasa (1992) 
compares the import price differences of seven German products16 within the U.S. and 
Canada from 1978 to 1987. He presents evidence suggesting that the temporary 
component in the exchange rate increases the frequency of PTM.  The author uses 120 
monthly observations produced by the customs agencies in the U.S. and Canada to test 
the model. He argues that the data set contains narrowly defined commodities.17 He finds 
that the German export prices in the U.S. increased more than in Canada. The dollar 
appreciated against the Deutschmark; moreover, German exporters considered 
adjustment costs to be an important factor in both the U.S. and Canada, except in the 
sewing machine and shoe markets.  
Marston (1990) uses data from the Bank of Japan, which contains export and 
domestic prices for disaggregated products to estimate PTM in the case of Japanese 
manufacturing firms in the 1980s. The author shows how the firms in selected 
industries18 responded to changes in the real exchange rate by varying their export prices 
relative to prices for the domestic market. He found strong evidence of the Japanese 
firms’ PTM behavior as the real exchange rate changes in the U.S. market across 17 
industries. Two notable exceptions are the small truck and camera industries. In addition, 
the Japanese firms responded less to the exchange rate change in their price when the yen 
depreciated than when the yen appreciated. Also, the Japanese firms’ PTM behavior 
helped them protect their competitive position in the U.S. market. 
                                                 
16 Cars, wine, beer, industrial sewing machines, suits, brass rods and leather footwear. p. 18. The authors 
chose these commodities because of the available data stability. 
17 Also, the author provided the problems of these data. p. 16.  
18 Such as transport and tractor equipment, consumer goods.  
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Krugman (1987) uses the method below to measure, for example, German 
exporter’s PTM behavior empirically: 
Germany's export price in the U.S. - Germany's export price in other countries. 
Germany's export price in the U.S. - Other countries' export price in the U.S.
 
 
He uses the denominator to measure the real exchange rate changes. If Krugman’s ratio 
equals zero, there is no PTM. Otherwise, the author concludes that there is exporters’ 
PTM behavior. Krugman uses unit values of exports in 1980 and 1983 to create the price 
index in order to test the criteria of PTM above. The result shows 0.39 in the machinery 
and transport equipment industries and he concludes that there is PTM behavior by 
German exporters in the US market relative to other countries. The data shows, however, 
that there is no PTM behavior in other German export industries to the U.S. 
Froot and Klemperer (1989) test the extent to which expectations of future 
exchange rate changes affected the degree of PTM in the 1980s. The authors focused on 
the measurement of the expected exchange rate changes, as well as on the relationship 
between the expected exchange rate changes and PTM in the U.S and other countries. To 
measure the degree of PTM, they considered foreign exporters’ profit margins as real 
exchange rates changed. According to the authors, the trends found in foreign exporters’ 
profit margins almost follow that of the real value of the dollar, meaning there is perverse 
movement of export price in the U.S. as the real exchange rate changes: in other words, 
as dollar value increases, the dollar import price increases and foreign exporters’ profit 
margin increases as well with constant marginal cost assumption.  
In order to measure expected exchange rate changes,19 Froot and Klemperer uses 
interest rate differentials and survey data.20 The authors argue that these data demonstrate 
                                                 
19 See more about exchange rate expectations in Ito (1990). 
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that exporters viewed the exchange rate changes in the 1980s as a temporary 
phenomenon. If exporters expected the appreciation of the dollar in the 1980s to be 
temporary, then according to the market-share model of Froot and Klemperer, exporters 
should have taken high-profit margins from the temporary exchange rate changes. The 
authors performed ordinary least squares (OLS) using these interest-rate differentials and 
survey data to test their model.  
( ), , , , , , , ,1 1 2 ,i UK US i UK JA US JA US JA i US JAt t t t t tp p E e eβ β+Δ − Δ = Δ Δ + Δ + ε
)
                                                                                                                                                
  
where ; th industry ; the change from period t-1 to t in the log of the real 
dollar/yen rate. ; and the percentage-point change from period t-1 to t in 
expected depreciation of the real dollar/yen rate over the following period.
i i ,US JAteΔ( ,1US JAt tE e +Δ Δ
21
 
The authors argue that , the differential effect of exchange rate 
changes on foreign exporters’ prices in different markets, gives a more precise result of 
PTM from expected depreciations.  
, , , ,i UK US i UK JA
t tp pΔ − Δ
Using the empirical test, Froot and Klemperer conclude that there is no PTM and 
perfect exchange rate pass-through is evident when there is permanent exchange rate 
change. They could not find evidence to support the notion that PTM depends on the 
expectation of future dollar depreciation. In short, they conclude that the evidence on 
PTM is fragile. 
Knetter (1993) introduces the following empirical framework to study PTM 
behavior in several different export markets, using the annual value and quantity of 
exports in the U.S., the U.K., Japan, and Germany: 
 
20 The nominal interest differential between U.S and foreign eurocurrency deposits and survey data on 
exchange rate expectations from 1982-1985. p. 645. 
21 Froot and Klemperer (1989) p. 647. 
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it t i it itp xθ β εΔ = + Δ + , 
where is the log of the export price and p x  is the log of the destination-specific 
exchange rate -- the number of buyer’s currency over a seller’s currency. He estimates tθ  
and iβ . The author considers that tθ  will vary over time by changes in exporters’ 
marginal costs.  
In the case of a competitive market, 0iβ =  shows that a change in currency 
values would be fully passed through to the buyer and no LCPS would exist. In contrast, 
with iβ <0, the evidence is consistent with LCPS. In other words, depreciation of buyers’ 
currency decreases sellers’ markup and appreciation decreases sellers’ markup. Finally, 
with iβ >0, the evidence is consistent with the notion that destination-specific markup 
adjustment amplifies the effect of the exchange rate changes on the price in units of the 
buyer’s currency. 
 However, if the exporter is a monopolist, the value of β is determined by the 
convexity of the demand schedule in the destination market: for example, 0iβ =  means 
constant elasticity with respect to price and no LCPS; iβ <0 indicates less convex 
demand and the existence of LCPS. Therefore, from the value of iβ , we can infer how 
responsive the consumers are to various price levels in the goods market as well. 
Three important empirical results of the paper by Knetter (1993) are: First, the 
market in which the exporters sell the products is not important in determining the 
existence of PTM behavior. Actually, Japanese exporters did apply the same PTM 
behavior to the U.S. market as with other markets. Second, the exporters of the four 
countries (U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan) in the same industry exhibit similar PTM as 
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the exchange rate changes. Thus, Knetter (1993) concludes that industry is important to 
explaining the pattern of PTM behavior. Third, after mixing all the industries, the 
exporters in the U.S. and U.K. exploit different PTM according to the particular industry 
to which the exporters belong. However, those in Germany and Japan exhibit PTM no 
matter what the industry. For all the industries of each country, the degree of markup-
adjustment as the exchange rate fluctuates is about 36 percent for German and British 
exporters, about 48 percent for Japanese exporters and zero percent for US exporters.   
Knetter (1989) tries to separate the marginal cost changes from the markup 
changes empirically in order to measure more precise markup changes as the exchange 
rate changes and to examine the exporters’ price discrimination according to the 
destination markets. The author uses a “fixed-effects regression model”:  
ititiittit USP +++= lnln βλθ ,    
         tθ = time effect, iλ = country effect,  = regression disturbance, itU:
 
where time effect indicates the price changes that all the countries have in each period. 
Country effect is country-specific changes as exchange rate changes measuring the 
markups. 
  The author reaches similar conclusions to those in Knetter (1993); U.S. exporters 
are not responding through price changes according to the exchange rate changes 
sensitively. However, the paper provides strong evidence that German exporters do not 
reflect exchange rate changes to dollar prices in the U.S. market.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MODEL 
 
In the model economy, the firms choose output levels as the exchange rate 
changes, taking the market demand as given. And then the market demand determines the 
price in a country based on the output levels. I measure the impact that movements in the 
exchange rate have on the equilibrium price. Initially, I focus on the existence of the 
PTM. More specifically, I derive the conditions under which PTM exists. Basically, I 
presume that the output level is the factor that can account for why exporters behave 
according to PTM. Output level is determined endogenously in the model, depending on 
the exchange rate and the cost of production that maximizes the exporters’ profit that is 
expressed in its own currency. Output level will affect the price of the goods because it 
enters into the inverse demand function. The implication is that prices are affected by the 
exchange rate through the output level.  In other words, the profit-maximizing prices in 
the domestic market and in the foreign market contain the exchange rate, as well as the 
cost of production. Thus, it is possible to directly obtain the exchange-rate elasticity of 
the domestic price and the exchange-rate elasticity of the export price. I use the ratio of 
the exchange-rate elasticity of the export price to that of the domestic price in order to 
investigate the existence of exporters’ PTM behavior between the domestic market and 
the foreign market.  
The model economy gives means of understanding the existence of PTM and 
provides an explicit method to test the existence of PTM with the reduced form of the 
exchange rate and the cost of production.   
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3.1 Assumptions 
There are two countries, denoted A and B, and each country has one firm. For 
simplicity, I refer to these as firm A and firm B, respectively. Each firm produces one 
good and the goods are similar; more specifically, goods A and B are near-perfect 
substitutes. This is the two-way trade model. Both firms sell their products in both their 
own domestic market and foreign market. Firms charge the local-currency price in the 
foreign market. The consumers in both countries have the same preferences for the 
goods. We assume that each firm faces a linear demand curve for the product in both the 
domestic and the foreign market and unit cost of production. Each firm produces the 
goods only in the domestic market, excluding the case of outsourcing production in other 
countries. The exchange rate is given exogenously. These two firms maximize their own 
currency value of the profits. 
 
3.2 The Model 
Firm A maximizes the profits -- expressed in its own currency -- as follows: 
 
max  
                (1)
A A AD B AB AD AD AB AB
AD BA AD BD AB AB AD AD AB AB
P q eP q C q C q
a q q q e a q q q C q C q
π = + − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
        
Firm B maximizes the profits -- expressed in its own currency -- as follows: 
 
1max  
1                (2)
B B BD A BA BD BD BA BA
BD AB BD AD BA BA BD BD BA BA
P q P q C q C q
e
a q q q a q q q C q C q
e
π = + − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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where  ( ) denotes the price of the products that are sold in country i  and is an 
inverse demand function of  (
iP ,i A B=
iQ ,i A B= ). For simplicity, I assume that the demand 
curve, which each firm faces in both its domestic and foreign market, is a linear demand 
curve, and that consumers have the same preferences across countries: 
 
A AP a Q= −   
,        B BP a Q= − a  in both equations is constant and . 0a >
 
Firms A and B charge the price of AP  in country A to sell the product. AP  is expressed 
in country A’s currency. Firms A and B charge the price of  in country B to sell the 
product.  is in terms of country B’s currency. Thus, each firm imposes the local-
currency price as an export price.  In other words, firm A charges 
BP
BP
AP  in the domestic 
market in its own currency and  in the foreign market (country B) in country B’s 
currency. Firm B charges  in the domestic market in its own currency and 
BP
BP AP  in the 
foreign market (country A) in country A’s currency.  is the total quantity of the goods 
supplied by firm A and B to country  (
iQ
i ,i A B= ). The total quantity supplied to country 
A is AQ :  
 
A AD BAQ q q= + . 
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ADq  is the quantity of the product produced by firm A and sold in the domestic market. 
 is the quantity of the product produced by firm B and sold in country A. In the case 
of country B, the total quantity supplied to country B is : 
BAq
BQ
 
B BD AQ q q= + B . 
 
Similarly,  is the quantity of the output produced by firm B and sold in the domestic 
market. 
BDq
ABq  is the quantity of the good produced by firm A and sold in country B. 
Therefore, we can rewrite AP  and  as follows: BP
           
                                  (3) ,     where ,    0A A AD BA A AD BAP a Q a q q Q q q a= − = − − = + >
,     where ,    0B B BD AB B BD ABP a Q a q q Q q q a= − = − − = + > .                     (4) 
 
AP  is the function of the output level of ADq  and  and  relies on the output level 
of  and 
BAq BP
BDq ABq . The nominal exchange rate is denoted by  and given exogenously. It 
represents the units of country A’s currency per unit of country B’s currency: 
e
 
'  
'  
A s currencye
B s currency
= .                                                                                          (5) 
 
Firm A charges AP  and sells the quantity of ADq  in the domestic market; thus 
A ADP q  is the revenue that firm A gets from the domestic market. Firm A charges  and BP
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sells ABq  in the foreign market, so  is the revenue that firm A will earn in the 
foreign market in terms of country A’s currency. As the result, the total revenue that firm 
A can achieve in terms of its own currency is 
B ABeP q
A AD B ABP q eP q+ . And, as firm B charges 
 and sells the quantity of  in the domestic market, firm B will earn the revenue 
 in the domestic market. Firm B charges
BP BDq
B BDP q AP  and sells the quantity of  in the 
foreign market; therefore, firm B will get the revenue, 
BAq
1
e
A BAP q  from the foreign market 
expressed in country B’s currency. In consequence, the total possible revenue for firm B 
in terms of its own currency is 1
e
B BD A BAP q P q+ . 
The costs of the production for each firm are expressed in terms of its own 
currency, assuming as well that each firm produces the goods in the domestic market 
excluding the case of outsourcing production in other countries.  is the unit cost to 
produce 
ADC
ADq , and  is the unit cost to produce ABC ABq . The model assumes that  and 
 are different because selling the product in a foreign country requires costs, such as 
transportations cost.  is the total cost to firm A to produce 
ADC
ABC
ATC ADq  and ABq . The unit 
cost of  for country B to produce  and  to produce  are different.  is 
the total cost to firm B to produce 
BDC BDq BAC BAq BTC
BDq  and . However, the total cost of  and 
are the same and I designate this as : 
BAq ATC
BTC C
 
,      ,       ,  0AT AD AD AB AB AD AB AD ADC C q C q C C C C= + ≠ >
>
                          (6) 
,      ,       ,  0BT BD BD BA BA BD BA BD BAC C q C q C C C C= + ≠                             (7) 
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AT BTC C= = C .                                                                                              (8) 
 
From equations (1) and (2), let us take the first-order conditions in order to get the 
equilibrium prices and quantities for countries A and B.  
The first-order conditions with respect to ADq , ABq ,  and  are 
respectively:  
BDq BAq
 
        
A
ADq
π∂ =∂     a – 2q
AD – qBA – CAD = 0,              
22
ADBA
AD Cqaq −−=                 (9) 
 
A
ABq
π∂ =∂     e(a – q
BD) – 2eqAB – CAB = 0,     
2 2
BD AB
AB a q Cq
e
−= − ,                  (10) 
 
B
BDq
π∂ =∂      a – 2q
BD – qAB – CBD = 0,          
2 2
AB BD
BD a q Cq −= − ,                  (11) 
 
B
BAq
π∂ =∂     
1
e
(a – qAD) – 2
e
qBA – CBA = 0,   
2 2
AD BA
BA a q eCq −= − .                (12)  
 
The above four equations show the profit-maximizing conditions -- marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost -- when each firm A and B produces. From the four equations, 
equilibrium quantities are derived in both countries: 
 
* 2
3 3 3
BA AD
AD a eC Cq = + − ,     if ,                            (13) 2BA ADa eC C+ > * 0ADq >
* 2
3 3 3
BD AB
AB a C Cq
e
= + − ,     if ,                           (14) ( ) 2BD ABe a C C+ > * 0ABq >
 43
* 2
3 3 3
AB BD
BD a C Cq
e
= + − ,     if 2AB BDae , q                            (15)  C eC+ > * 0BD >
* 2
3 3 3
AD BA
BA a C eCq = + − ,     if 2AD BAa C eC+ > * 0BAq >, .                          (16) 
 
Each firm’s output level in the domestic market and the foreign market relies on 
the exchange rate and not only its own cost of production but also the other firm’s 
production cost. Firm A’s domestic output level ( ), for example, is determined by 
the exchange rate ( e ), firm A’s cost of production for the goods in country A ( ) and 
firm B’s cost of production for the exports to country A ( ).  is an increasing 
function in  and exchange rate, and is a decreasing function in . It means that 
firm A can sell more products in the domestic market if firm B has higher cost of exports 
to country A and if country A’s currency depreciates. As well, firm A sells fewer 
products if it has higher cost of goods for the domestic market. 
*ADq
ADC
BAC *ADq
BAC ADC
In equation (14), firm A’s optimal output level in the foreign market ( ) relies 
on firm A’s unit cost of producing  to sell in country B ( ) and firm B’s unit cost 
of producing  to sell in the domestic market ( ).  is an increasing function in 
 and the exchange rate, and is a decreasing function in . It implies that firm A 
can sell more goods in the foreign market (country B) if firm B’s cost of producing goods 
for the domestic market is higher and if country A’s currency depreciates. Firm A sells 
fewer goods if it has higher cost of exports to the foreign country.    
*ABq
*ABq ABC
*BDq BDC *ABq
BDC ABC
Using equations (9) and (12), we can draw the firms’ best response curve 
choosing the equilibrium output level in country A. Equation (9) represents firm A’s best 
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response curve in the domestic market and equation (12) is firm B’s best response curve 
in country A. In country B, the firms also react to each other to choose the best output 
level with given costs and the exchange rate. Equation (11) presents firm B’s best 
reaction curve in the domestic market. Equation (10) is firm A’s best reaction curve in 
country B. The figures below show the equilibrium output levels in country A and in 
country B respectively: 
 
                  ADq    
 
 
                  BAa eC−
                            
2 2
AD BA
BA a q eCq −= −   
                                   
 
     
2
ADa C−  
            *ADq                                       
22
ADBA
AD Cqaq −−=  
 
                                                                                                       BAq
                                         *BAq
2
BAa eC−                 ADa C−
                     Figure 3.1                                                                   
                     Firms’ best response curve in country A 
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                     BDq
 
     
ABCa
e
−              
                            
2 2
BD AB
AB a q Cq
e
−= −   
                                   
 
     
2
BDa C−  
                                                   *BDq
2 2
AB BD
BD a q Cq −= −  
 
                                                                                                      ABq  
                                      *ABq    
2 2
ABa C
e
−                   BDa C−
                     Figure 3.2                                                                   
                     Firms’ best response curve in country B 
 
In Figure 3.1, we have the equilibrium at the intersection of two curves since we 
have the conditions in equations (13) and (16) in order to get  and  
respectively.
* 0ADq > * 0BAq >
22 In Figure 3.2, we also have the equilibrium at the intersection of two 
curves because of the conditions in equations (14) and (15) to get  and  
respectively.  
* 0ABq > * 0BDq >
From equations (3), (13) and (16), the equilibrium price of the output that firms A 
and B charge in country A in terms of country A’s currency is:  
                                                 
22 On the vertical axis, 
2
AD
BA a Ca eC
−− >  is valid. If we rewrite this inequality, we have 
 or 2 2 BA ADa eC a C− >− + 0 2 BAADa  which is the condition we have in equation (16). And on 
the horizontal axis, 
eCC+ >
2
BA
ADa eC a C
− −<  is effective. If we rearrange this inequality, we have 
2BA ADa eC C+ >  and it is the condition we assumed in equation (13). In Figure 3.2, we can reach the 
same conclusion for the vertical axis because of the condition in equation (14), and for the horizontal axis 
because of the condition in equation (15).  
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* * *
3 3 3
AD BA
A AD BA a C eCP a q q= − − = + + .                                                        (17) 
 
From equations (4), (14) and (15), the equilibrium price of the output that firms A 
and B charge in country B expressed in country B’s currency is:  
 
* * *
3 3 3
BD AB
B BD AB a C CP a q q
e
= − − = + + .                                                         (18) 
 
In equations (17) and (18), the advantage of this model is that the exchange rate 
has effect on both domestic price and the export price for each country, instead of only 
the export price for each country. In addition, the prices in the countries depend on not 
only the domestic firm’s cost of production but also the exporter’s cost of production.  
The equilibrium price of the product that firm A receives in the foreign market 
(country B) expressed in country A’s currency as the exchange rate fluctuates is:  
 
*
3 3 3
BD AB
B ae eC CeP = + + .                                                                               (19) 
 
The equilibrium price of the output that firm B gets in the foreign market (country 
A) in terms of country B’s currency as the exchange rate changes is:  
 
*
3 3 3
A ADP a C C
e e e
= + +
BA
.                                                                                  (20) 
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As a result, the optimal output level and the prices in both a domestic and a 
foreign market are derived endogenously to maximize each firm’s profit and are 
determined by the exchange rate and unit costs in the model. 
Next, let us identify the relationship between the exchange rate and the prices, and 
the relationship between the exchange rate and the output levels.  
 
Proposition 1: The price in country A charged by firm A and firm B is positively related 
to movements in the exchange rate; the price in country B charged by firm A and firm B 
is negatively related. 
  
Proof:    
*
0,
3
A BAP C
e
∂ = >∂                                                                                           (21) 
              
*
2 0.3
B ABP C
e e
∂ = − <∂                                                                                        (22) 
 
Not surprisingly, if the exchange rate increases (country A’s currency 
depreciates), firm B increases the export price in country A. And firm A charges a higher 
price in the domestic market as well. The price charged in country A ( *AP ) by both firms 
is dependent on country B’s unit cost of producing  ( ) according to equation (21). 
This implies that firm B (the exporter in country A) sets the export price based on its unit 
cost of producing the output level in country A, , and firm A follows the price that 
firm B imposes in country A. In fact, it is not so hard to observe these pricing behaviors 
among firms if the market is under imperfect competition. And, obviously, we can say 
BAq BAC
BAq
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that each firm takes into account the exchange rate changes when it sets the domestic 
price and the local currency export price.   
According to equation (22), firm A charges a lower price in country B if the 
exchange rate increases (country B’s currency appreciates). Firm B also sets a lower price 
in the domestic market. The price charged in country B ( ) by both firms is 
determined by country A’s unit cost of producing 
*BP
ABq  ( ) and the exchange rate. So, 
in country B, firm A as an exporter sets a lower price and the domestic firm B imposes 
the same price as firm A charges.  
ABC
In other words, if the exchange rate increases (country B’s currency appreciates), 
firm A increases the price in the domestic market and decreases the price in the foreign 
market. Firm B imposes a lower price in the domestic market and higher price in the 
foreign market as the exchange rate increases (country A’s currency depreciates). 
What is the effect of the exchange rate changes on the output levels? 
 
Proposition 2: In country A, firm A’s output level increases but firm B’s output level 
decreases when both firms increase the price as the exchange rate increases (country A’s 
currency depreciates); in country B, firm B’s output level decreases but firm A’s output 
level increases when both firms decrease the price as the exchange rate increases 
(country B’s currency depreciates).  
 
Proof:    
*
0
3
AD BAq C
e
∂ = >∂ ,                                                                                          (23) 
  
* 2 0
3
BA BAq C
e
∂ = − <∂                                                                                        (24) 
 49
              
*
2 03
BD ABq C
e e
∂ = − <∂                                                                                         (25) 
  
*
2
2 0
3
AB ABq C
e e
∂ = >∂                                                                                          (26)     
 
Both firm A and firm B increase the price in country A as country A’s currency 
devaluates but it brings a different effect on the output level for each firm. We have the 
result that firm A’s output level in the domestic market increases and firm B’s output 
level in country A decreases when the price increases as exchange rate increases (country 
A’s currency depreciates). It implies that domestic producers produce more output levels 
and consumers buy more domestic goods in country A if the domestic seller and the 
exporter charge the same price and the price increases as the exchange rate fluctuates. 
From equations (25) and (26), in country B, firm B will get a smaller output level 
but firm A will get a bigger output level when both firms impose a lower price as the 
exchange rate increases (country B’s currency is more valuable). This means that 
exporters produce more output levels and consumers buy more exports in country B if the 
domestic seller and the exporter charge the same price and the price decreases as the 
exchange rate moves. 
Overall, consumers in both countries buy the domestic goods more if the domestic 
producer and the foreign producer impose the same price and the price increases as the 
exchange rate fluctuates. In contrast, consumers buy the exports more if the domestic 
producer and the foreign producer charge the same price and the price is lower than 
before. 
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What is the implication for the trade balances between these countries then? 
 
Proposition 3: If a country’s currency depreciates, the country has a surplus in the trade 
balance with the other country; if a country’s currency appreciates, we have an 
indeterminate result in the country’s trade balance with the other country. 
             
Proof:    Country A: 
 
( )*
0,
3 3
B BDeP a C
e
∂ = + >∂                                                                                 (27) 
 
*
2
2 0
3
AB ABq C
e e
∂ = >∂ ,                                                                                        (28) 
             
*
0,
3
A BAP C
e
∂ = >∂                                                                                             (29) 
 
* 2 0
3
BA BAq C
e
∂ = − <∂ .                                                                                      (30) 
  
  Country B: 
*
2 2 0,3 3
A
AD
P
e a C
e e e
⎛ ⎞∂ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ = − − <∂                                                                            (31)  
* 2 0
3
BA BAq C
e
∂ = − <∂ ,                                                                                       (32) 
             
*
2 0,3
B ABP C
e e
∂ = − <∂                                                                                          (33) 
 
*
2
2 0
3
AB ABq C
e e
∂ = >∂ .                                                                                        (34) 
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Let us consider the export side first for country A: the export price that firm A 
receives expressed by country A’s currency ( ) increases as country A’s currency 
becomes less valuable. Additionally, the output level of firm A in country B (
*BeP
*ABq ) grows 
bigger as country A’s currency depreciates. Therefore the total revenue of the exports that 
firm A receives in terms of its own currency increases as country A’s currency 
depreciates. On the import side, the local-currency import price that firm B charges in 
country A ( *AP ) increases. However, the output level of the import in country A ( ) 
decreases. If we compare equations (29) and (30), the decrease in the quantity is greater 
than the increase in the price. Thus the value of imports that country A pays falls as 
country A’s currency depreciates. As the result, country A has a surplus in the trade 
balance when country A’s currency depreciates -- the exchange rate increases. Generally 
speaking, if country A’s price elasticity of demand for the imports is elastic, the total 
amount of money that country A pays will decrease. Therefore country A has a surplus 
for certain in the trade balance. In contrast, if country A’s price elasticity of demand for 
the imports is inelastic, the total amount of money that country A pays in terms of its own 
currency will increase. In this case, both the value of exports and imports increases so we 
have an ambiguous result about the trade balance. If the increase in the value of exports is 
greater than that of imports, country A has a surplus. And if the increase in the value of 
exports is smaller than that of imports, country A has a deficit.  
*BAq
From equations (31), (32), (33) and (34), the export price that firm B receives in 
terms of its own currency decreases as country B’s currency is appreciated -- the 
exchange rate increases. At the same time, the output level that firm B has in country A 
( ) grows smaller as country B’s currency appreciates. Thus the total revenue of the *BAq
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exports that firm B earns in terms of its own currency decreases as country B’s currency 
becomes more valuable. On the import side of country B, its local-currency import price 
( ) that firm A imposes decreases. However, the output level of the imports in country 
B (
*BP
*ABq ) increases. If we compare equations (33) and (34), the increase in the quantity is 
greater than the decrease in the price. Hence the value of imports that country B pays 
rises as country B’s currency appreciates. As the result, we have an ambiguous result in 
the trade balance for country B when country B’s currency appreciates. It is because we 
have a decrease in the value of exports and an increase in the value of imports and we do 
not know which one is greater than the other.  On the other hand, we conclude that 
country B has a surplus when its own currency depreciates. 
 
 3.3 Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Is there any exchange rate pass-through? 
 
*
* 1.3
3 3 3
A BA BA
AD BAA A
P e C e eC
a C eCe P a C eC
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞∂ × = × = <⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
D BA+                               (35) 
 
*AP  is the local-currency price that firms A and B charge in country A. Firm A 
imposes *AP  in the domestic market and firm B charges *AP  in country A as the export 
price. In order to examine the degree of ERPT in country A, I want to determine the 
exchange-rate elasticity of the price in country A as shown above in equation (35). It is 
less than 1, indicating that there is an incomplete ERPT in the country. Less than 1 for the 
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elasticity also means that the percentage change in the price in country A is less than the 
percentage change in the exchange rate. So firms A and B do not pass through the full 
proportion of the exchange rate movements into the domestic price in the case of firm A 
and into the export price in the case of firm B. 
 We can also measure the ERPT in country B as follows: 
 
*
* 2 13
3 3 3
B AB AB
BD ABB BD AB
P e C e C
ea eC Ce P e ea eC C
e e e
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞∂ × = − × = − <⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+ .                   (36) 
 
In country B, firm A charges  as the local-currency export price and firm B 
imposes  as the domestic price. The exchange-rate elasticity of the price in country B 
is incomplete as well. It implies that firms A and B pass through only part of the 
exchange rate movements into the price in the country. 
*BP
*BP
 In both markets, we have incomplete ERPT for the domestic price and the export 
price. And the result of incomplete ERPT is consistent with the common observations in 
the international goods market.   
Moreover, let us calculate the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A’s export price 
that is expressed by its own currency as given below. Firm A’s exchange rate pass-
through is incomplete: 
 
( )*
* 13 3
3 3 3
BDB BD
BD ABB BD AB
e a Cep e a C e
ae eC Ce ep ae eC C
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ +⎛ ⎞∂ × = + × = <⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+ .                 (37) 
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The exchange-rate elasticity of firm B’s export price that is expressed by its own 
currency is as follows. The exchange rate pass-through is incomplete: 
 
*
2 2* 3 3
3 3 3
                            1.
A
AD
AD BAA
AD
AD BA
P
e e a C e
a C Ce e eP
e ee
a C
a C eC
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠ × = − − ×⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠ ⎜ + +⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎝⎝ ⎠
+= − <+ +
⎟⎟⎠                                            (38) 
 
We discover further implications about exporter’s invoice choice and the ERPT as 
follows. 
 
Proposition 4: The degree of ERPT is higher when the exporter invoices in its own 
currency than when it invoices in the buyer’s currency. 
 
Proof:   
*
*
B A
B BD
B
A
P e C
e P ea eC C
⎧ ⎫∂⎪ ⎪× = −⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭B
  <  ( )⎧ * *
BDB
B BD AB
e a Cep e
e ep ae eC C
⎫+∂⎪ ⎪× =⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
,           (39) 
 
*
*
A B
A AD
P e eC
e P a C eC
⎧ ⎫∂ × =⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎩ ⎭
A
BA   <  
*
*
A
AD
AD BAA
P
e e a C
e a CP
e
eC
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞∂⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ +⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ × = −⎨ ⎬∂ +⎛ ⎞ +⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
.      (40) 
  
In the case of firm A, we derive inequality (39) from equations (36) and (37). 
Firm A’s exchange rate pass-through to the export price when the export price is 
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measured by its own currency, 
( )BD
BD AB
e a C
ae eC C
+
+ + , is greater than the exchange rate pass- 
through to the export price when the export price is expressed by the buyer’s currency, 
AB
BD AB
C
ea eC C
− + + . This is true because of the condition, , in equation 
(14) in order to make firm A sell more than zero quantity of the good in country B 
( ). If  or 
( ) 2BD ABe a C C+ >
* 0ABq > ( ) 2BD ABe a C C+ > ( )
2
BD
ABe a C C+ >  is valid from equation (14), then 
 is binding as well in inequality (39). Thus, firm A’s degree of ERPT is 
higher when it sets the export price in its own currency rather than in the buyer’s 
currency.  
( )BD ABe a C C+ >
We have the result of inequality (40) based on equations (35), (38) and (16) for 
firm B. Firm B’s exchange rate pass-through to the export price when the export price is 
measured by its own currency, 
AD
AD BA
a C
a C eC
+− + + , is greater than the exchange rate pass-
through to the local-currency export price, 
BA
AD BA
eC
a C eC+ + . Firm B has the condition of 
2ADa C eC+ > BA  in equation (16) in order to get more than zero quantity of the good in 
country A ( ). If * 0BAq > 2AD BAa C or eC+ >
2
AD
BAa C eC+ >  from equation (16), then 
clearly the inequality, ADa C eC+ > BA , is effective in inequality (40). Therefore we can 
conclude that firm B’s degree of ERPT is higher when it sets the export price in its own 
currency rather than in the buyer’s currency. 
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3.4 On PTM 
Now I will examine whether there is PTM behavior by each firm or not applying 
the definition of the PTM: the relative price change in the domestic and the foreign 
market as exchange rate changes matters in determining the existence of PTM. If firm 
A’s export price in country B reflects the same proportion of the exchange rate 
movements as the firm A’s domestic price does, then there is no PTM. Otherwise, there 
exists firm A’s PTM behavior between the domestic and the foreign market as the 
exchange rate moves. 
 
3.4.1 Firm A’s Local-Currency Export Price vs. Firm A’s Domestic Price 
Following the definition I presented in chapter 2, I want to identify the ratio of the 
exchange-rate elasticity of firm A’s export price to the exchange-rate elasticity of firm 
A’s domestic price. It measures the relative price changes in the domestic and the foreign 
market as the exchange rate fluctuates and allows us to investigate the existence of PTM 
behavior by firm A. We can get the ratio from the equation (35) and (36) as given: 
 
       
*
*
*
*
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A's local-currency export price in country B
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A's domestic price
   
ABB
BD ABB
A BA
A AD BA
CP e
ea eC Ce P
P e eC
e P a C eC
⎛ ⎞∂ −⎜ ⎟× + +⎝ ⎠∂= =∂ ⎛×∂ + +⎝
( ) ,             (41)
( )
AB AD BA
BA BD AB
C a C eC
eC ea eC C
− + += + +⎞⎜ ⎟⎠
        
                                                                                                                                     
If ( 1
( )
AB AD BA
BA BD AB
C a C eC
eC ea eC C
− + + =+ +
)  then, there is no PTM by firm A.                              (42) 
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If ( ) (1 or 1
( ) ( )
AB AD BA AB AD BA
BA BD AB BA BD AB
C a C eC C a C eC
eC ea eC C eC ea eC C
− + + − + +>+ + + +
) < , firm A’s PTM behavior 
exists.                                                                                                                          (43) 
 
More specifically, in the case of equation (42), the export price of firm A in 
country B decreases in exactly the same way as the domestic price in country A increases 
as the exchange rate increases. In this case, again, how much exchange rate chage passes 
through to the export price and the domestic price does not matter in determining the 
existence of PTM. Therefore, we can say that there are no differences in prices as the 
exchange rate changes according to the market -- the domestic and the foreign market -- 
and there is no PTM. 
On the other hand, in inequality (43), when the exchange rate increases (country 
B’s currency value increases), the decrease in firm A’s local-currency export price in 
country B relative to the exchange rate increase is greater than the increase in the 
domestic price in country A relative to the exchange rate increase (the numerator of (43) 
is greater than the denominator). Or the decrease in firm A’s local-currency export price 
in country B relative to the exchange rate increase is smaller than the increase in the 
domestic price in country A relative to the exchange rate increase (the numerator of (43) 
is smaller than the denominator). How much exchange rate passes through to the export 
price and the domestic price does not matter to the determination of the existence of 
PTM. The result in inequality (43) gives us the evidence of firm A’s PTM behavior as the 
exchange rate changes. 
 
 
 58
3.4.2 Firm B’s Local-Currency Export Price vs. Firm B’s Domestic Price 
Similarly, we have the ratio below from the equations (35) and (36) in the case of 
firm B and use it to determine the existence of PTM behavior:                           
*
*
*
*
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm B's local-currency export price in country A
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm B's domestic price
   
BAA
AD BAA
B AB
B BD AB
eCP e
a C eCe P
P e C
e P ea eC C
⎛ ⎞∂ ⎜ ⎟× + +⎝ ⎠∂= =∂ ⎛× −∂ + +⎝
( ) ,                     (44)
( )
BA BD AB
AB AD BA
eC ea eC C
C a C eC
+ += − + +⎞⎜ ⎟⎠
 
If ( 1
( )
BA BD AB
AB AD BA
eC ea eC C
C a C eC
+ + =− + +
) , there is no firm B’s PTM behavior.                          (45) 
If ( ) (1 or <1
( ) ( )
BA BD AB BA BD AB
AB AD BA AB AD BA
eC ea eC C eC ea eC C
C a C eC C a C eC
+ + + +>− + + − + +
) , then firm B’s PTM exists 
between the domestic and the foreign market.                                                            (46) 
 
Therefore, from inequalities (41) and (44), we know that if one firm practices 
PTM behavior, the other firm also exhibits PTM between the domestic and the foreign 
market since the two equations are reciprocals of each other. 
 
3.5 PTM and Invoice Currency 
So far, we have assumed that the firms impose export prices in buyer’s currency 
when we investigate PTM. What would happen to the PTM if the firms set the export 
prices in their own currency? Is there any effect of the invoice currency on the PTM?  
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In order to answer the question, it would be useful to examine the PTM when the 
exporters set the export price in their own currency. Let us assume that the export price is 
expressed by the seller’s currency in the foreign market. 
 Based on the new assumption about the invoice price of the exports, firm A 
charges AP  in the domestic market and  in the foreign market (country B). Firm B 
charges  in the domestic market and 
BeP
BP
AP
e
 in country A. So,  denotes the price of the 
product that country i  charges in the domestic market (country ) and is an inverse 
demand function of Q  ( ). And, as we had before,  is the total quantity of the 
goods supplied by firms A and B to country  (
iP
i
i ,  i A B= iQ
i ,  i A B= ). Thus, nothing has changed in 
equations (1) and (2) to maximize each firm’s profit in terms of its own currency and in 
other assumptions we made before.  
 Now, let us investigate PTM by getting the ratio of the exchange-rate elasticity of 
the export price when the firms set the invoice currency in terms of their own currency to 
the exchange-rate elasticity of the domestic price for each country in this case. 
 
3.5.1 Firm A’s Export Price in Terms of its Own Currency vs. Firm A’s Domestic Price 
We have the ratio of the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A’s export price in terms 
of country A’s currency to the exchange-rate elasticity of country A’s domestic price for 
firm A from the equations (35) and (37) as given: 
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the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A's export price in terms of country A's currency
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A's domestic price  
( )
( )(
( )
)
*
*
*
*
     ,
BD
B
BD AB BD AD BAB
A BA BA BD AB
A AD BA
e a C
ep e
ae eC C a C a C eCe ep
P e eC C ae eC C
e P a C eC
⎛ ⎞+∂ ⎜ ⎟× ⎜ ⎟+ + + + +∂ ⎝ ⎠= = =∂ ⎛ ⎞ + +× ⎜ ⎟∂ + +⎝ ⎠
              (47)                              
If 
( )( )
( ) 1
BD AD BA
BA BD AB
a C a C eC
C ae eC C
+ + + =+ + , there is no PTM by firm A.                                (48) 
If 
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )1 or 1
BD AD BA BD AD BA
BA BD AB BA BD AB
a C a C eC a C a C eC
C ae eC C C ae eC C
+ + + + + +> <+ + + +  then, firm A’s PTM 
behavior exists.                                                                                                           (49) 
        
In the case of equation (48), much exchange rate passes through firm A’s export 
price in terms of country A’s currency increasing exactly as much as the domestic price 
in country A increases as the exchange rate increases.23 In this case, again, how much 
exchange rate change passes through to the export price and the domestic price does not 
matter in determining the existence of PTM. As the result, we conclude that there is no 
PTM. 
However, in inequality (49), when the exchange rate increases, country B’s 
currency value increases, firm A’s export price in terms of its own currency increases 
more than the domestic price in country A increases, so we have greater than 1 for the 
                                                 
23 If the firms set the export price in the buyer’s currency, the export price decreases as the buyer’s currency 
appreciates. We can confirm that from equation (33) in the case of firm A. However, if the firms set the 
export price in its own currency, the export price increases as the buyer’s currency appreciates. Equation 
(27) indicates it in the case of firm A. 
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ratio; or, firm A’s export price in terms of country A’s currency increases less than the 
domestic price in country A increases, thus the ratio is less than 1. The degree of 
exchange rate pass-through to the export price and the domestic price is not important to 
determine the existence of PTM. This result gives us the evidence of firm A’s PTM 
behavior as the exchange rate varies. 
 
3.5.2 Firm B’s Export Price in Terms of its Own Currency vs. Firm B’s Domestic Price 
We use the ratio below from the equations (36) and (38) in the case of firm B to  
determine the existence of PTM behavior: 
 
                                                                                                                                  (50) 
If 
*
*
*
*
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm B's export price in terms of country B's currency
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A's domestic price
   
A
A AD
AD BA
B
B
P
e e
e P a C
e a C eC
P e
e P
⎛ ⎞∂ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ×∂ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ +−⎜ ⎟ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝= =∂ ×∂
( )( )
( ) ,
AD BD AB
AB AB AD BA
BD AB
a C ea eC C
C C a C eC
ea eC C
⎞⎜ ⎟ + + +⎠ =⎛ ⎞ + +−⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
  
 
( )( )
( ) 1
AD BD AB
AB AD BA
a C ea eC C
C a C eC
+ + + =+ + , there is no firm B’s PTM behavior.                 (51) 
If 
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )1 or 1
AD BD AB AD BD AB
AB AD BA AB AD BA
a C ea eC C a C ea eC C
C a C eC C a C eC
+ + + + + +> <+ + + + , firm B practices 
PTM behavior                                                                                                             (52) 
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3.5.3 The Effect of The Invoice Currency on PTM 
We can figure out the effect of the invoice currency on PTM for firm A by 
as 
y. We take the absolute value of the 
equatio
comparing equations (41) and (47). Equation (41) represents the situation that firm A h
the export price expressed by the buyer’s currenc
n when examining PTM.24 Let us rewrite the equation as follows: 
 
*
*    ( )
B
AB AD BA
A BA BD AB
P e
P e eC ea eC C
∂ ×
=∂ + +×
*
*
( )
( )                                                                (53)
( )
B
A
AB AD BA
BA BD AB
C a C eCe P
e P
C a C eC
e C ea eC C
− + +∂
∂
− + += × + +
                             
                                                                                                                     
Equation (47) indicates the case that firm A charges the export in terms of its own 
currency. We can rewrite it as given: 
 
( )( )
( )
*
*   
B
BD AD BA
A BA
ep e
P e C ae
∂ ×
=∂ +×
( ) ( )( )
*
*
 
                                                           (54)
B
BD AB
A
AD BA
BD
BA BD AB
a C a C eCe ep
eC C
e P
a C eC
a C
C ae eC C
+ + +∂
+
∂
+ += + × + +
                             
 
We do not know whether there exists PTM behavior from equations (53) and (54) 
because we cannot figure out whether these ratios are exactly 1 or greater than 1 or not 
                                                 
24 The sign of the ratio shows the decrease or increase in the prices in the markets and the absolute value of 
the ratio indicates the amount of relative price movements. The PTM is influenced by the value of the 
relative price movements instead of the direction of the price movements. Therefore we take the absolute 
value of the ratio to determine whether the ratio is greater than 1 or not and to get the degree of PTM. 
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with the given information. However, if there is any PTM behavior by firm A, we can say 
in which situation the firm presents a more severe PTM by comparing the values of 
equations (53) and (54). If we have a greater number for the ratio then it implies that the
firm practices a more severe PTM. So let us compare the value of equations (53) and (54) 
to determine in which case firm A exhibits a higher degree of PTM between the domestic 
and the foreign market.  
 
Proposition 5
 
: If there is any PTM behavior by firm A, the firm presents a more sever 
PTM between the domestic and the foreign market when it imposes the export price in 
terms of its own currency rather than it does in terms of the local-currency export price. 
 
Proof:      
( ) ( )( )
*
*
*
*
( )   
( )
B
AB AD BA
A BA BD AB
A
B
C a C eC
P e e C ea eC C
e P
a C eCe ep
⎧ ⎫∂ ⎪− + +*B
P e
e P
×⎪
*
*
*
               
B
AD BA
BD
A BA BD AB
A
ep e
a C
P e C ae eC C
e P
⎧ ⎫∂ ×
⎪ ⎪= ×⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪×⎪ ⎪∂⎩ ⎭
⎪ ⎪+ +∂⎪ ⎪
∂
< =
×
e compare the values of 
+ ×⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪∂⎩ ⎭
             (55) 
 
ABC
e
 and ( )BDa C+Basically, w  from equations (53) and 
(54). In addition, we have the condition,  from equation (14), in order 
to make firm A sell more than ze  products in country B ( ). We 
need this condition since we do not want to have the situation that firm B provides all the 
( ) 2BD ABe a C C+ >
ro quantity of * 0ABq >
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products in country B. So firms A and B will share the output level in country B with this 
condition. If we rewrite equation (14), we have the following inequality: 
( )
2
AB BDC a C
e
+< . Therefore we find that the inequality, ( )D , is valid. 
AB
BC a C
e
< + It 
means that equation (54) is greater than equation (53). In other words, firm A has a 
higher degree of PTM between the domestic and the foreign market when it imposes the 
export price in terms of its own currency. So we can conclude that the relative price 
differen eate n firm A
terms of its own currency on the contract than it does in terms of the buyer’s currency. 
Therefore (55) is valid as well. 
ange it, we have the equation as given: 
 
ce between these two markets is gr r whe  has the export price in 
How about firm B? Compare equations (44) and (50) to get the answer. Equation 
(44) shows that firm B charges the export price in the local-currency price. If we 
rearrange it, we have the following equation: 
 
            
Equation (50) presents the case that firm B has its own currency as the export 
price on the contract. If we rearr
( )
*
* ( )
( )
A
BA BD ABA
BA
P e
eC ea eC C
ea eC C
∂ × + +
×
+ +
*
*
   
( )
                                                                      (56)
( )
B AB AD BA
B
BD AB
AB AD BA
e P
P e C a C eC
e P
eC
C a C eC
∂ =∂ − + +
∂
= − × + +
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( )( )
( )
*
*
  
A
A
AD
P
e e
a C ea eCe
⎛ ⎞
⎝ ⎠ ×
⎜ ⎟ + +⎝ ⎠ =
( ) ( )( )
*
*
 
                                                                (57)
BD AB
B AB AD BA
B
BD AB
AD
AB AD BA
e P
C
P e C a C eC
e P
ea eC C
a C
C a C eC
∂⎜ ⎟
∂ ⎛ ⎞
+
∂ + +×∂
+ += + × + +
                                                                                                                                   
Proposition 6: If there is any PTM behavior by firm B, the firm presents a more severe 
PTM between the domestic and the foreign market when it imposes the export price in 
terms of its own currency rather than it does in terms of the local-currency export price. 
Proof:      
( )
*
* ( )
A
BD ABA
P e
ea eC C
⎧ ⎫∂ ×⎪ ⎪+ +⎪ ⎪∂
( ) ( )( )
*
*
*
*
*
*
   
( )
               
BA
B AB AD BA
B
A
A
BD AB
AD
B AB AD BA
B
e P eC
P e C a C eC
e P
P
e e
e P
ea eC Ce
a C
P e C a C eC
e P
= − ×∂ + + ⎪×⎪ ⎪∂⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞∂⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪×⎪ ⎪∂ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ + +⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠< = + ×⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪×⎪ ⎪∂⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
       (58) 
Let us compare the values,  and 
⎨ ⎬⎪
BAeC ( )ADa C+  from equations (56) and (57) to 
figure out which case has a higher degree of PTM. So we need the condition, 
2AD BA  
more than zero quantity of the good in country A ( ). If you rearrange the 
a C eC+ >  from equation (16). This condition guarantees that firm B provides
* 0BAq >
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2AD
BA a CeC +<inequality, we get . Hence, certainly we have the result that 
. It represents that the value of equation (57) is greater than equation (56). 
And inequality (58) is valid. Thus we conclude that, if any PTM is presented by firm B, 
ore severe PTM behavior between the domestic and the foreign 
es the export price in its own currency rather than in the buyer’s 
he Exchange Rate Movements in Country A 
If we assume that the exporters present its own currency as the export price on the 
domestic produc
follows in order to answer the question raised above: 
BA ADeC a C< +
the firm exhibits a m
market when it charg
currency.  
 
3.6 Price Sensitivity to T
contract to sell the goods in the foreign market, the model tells us which firm (the 
er or the exporter) is more price sensitive to the exchange rate changes in 
each country.   
Let me take the equations (35) and (38) and get the ratio of these two equations as 
*
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A's domestic price
A
e e
e
∂ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ×
*
*
*
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm B's export price in terms of country B's currency
   
A AD
AD BA
A
A
P
P a C
e a C eC
P e
e P
⎛ ⎞
∂ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ +−⎜ ⎟ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝= =∂ ×∂
 
( 
( )
BA
AD BA
BA AD BA BA
eC
a C eC
a
eC a C eC eC
⎞⎜ ⎟⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ +
= − + +
 
⎝ ⎠
)( )   1                                                   (59)
AD AD BA ADC a C eC a C+ + + += − >
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1
2
ADa C+ *BAFrom the equation (16), we have BAeC >  in order to get q > . Therefore, 
we know that the equ
0
1
ADa C+
BAeC
− > . This result ation (59) is greater than 1 as well: 
represents that firm B’s export price in terms of its own currency decreases more than 
firm A’s domestic price increases as the exchange rate increases -- as country B’s 
currency values more. In other words, if we assume that firm B sets the export price in its 
own currency, firm B (the exporter) is more price responsive to the exchange rate 
movements than firm A (the domestic firm) does in country A.25
 
3.7 Price Sensitivity to The Exchange Rate Movements in Country B 
From equations (36) and (37), we obtain the ratio of the equations as follows: 
 
( )*
*
*
hange-rate elasticity of firm A's ex  terms of countr rrency
   
BD
B
B AB
B
e a C
P e C
e P e
⎛ ⎞+
⎝ ⎠*
the exc port price in y A's cu
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm B's domestic price
BD AB
B
ep e
ea eC Ce ep
∂ ⎜ ⎟× ⎜ ⎟+ +∂= =
× −∂∂
( )( )
( )
( )
   1                                         (60)
BD AB
BD BD AB BD
ABAB BD AB
a eC C
e a C ea eC C e a C
CC ea eC C
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ +
                                                
⎝ ⎠
+ + + += − = − >+ +
 
 
25 We can also take the reciprocal of equation (59) to prove that firm B (the exporter in country A) is more 
price sensitive to the exchange rate fluctuations than firm A (the domestic firm) does in country A. In this 
case, we have the result that is less than 1 for the reciprocal of equation (59), though. 
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 ( )
BDe a C+We have 1AB >  from the equation (14) in order to have . Hence 
we can e equation (60) is greater than 1 as well:
* 0ABq >
2C
 ( ) 1
BD
AB
e a C
C
+ > say that th . This means 
that firm A’s export price in terms of its own currency increases more than firm B’s 
domestic price decreases as the exchange rate increases -- as country B’s currency 
appreciates. And firm A (the exporter) is more price responsive in terms of its own 
currency to the exchange rate changes than firm B (the domestic firm) is in country B. 
   
Proposition 7: The price of the export in each country is more responsive to the exchange 
rate movements than the price of the domestic good when exporters charge the export 
price in heir own curre
   
 
orter charge the same price and the price increases as the exchange rate 
 terms of t ncy.   
Proof:    (59) in country A and (60) in country B are valid as shown above. 
3.8 Summary 
The specified model provides endogenously determined output level related to the 
cost of production and the exchange rate. I find that domestic producers produce more 
output levels and consumers buy more domestic goods in a country if the domestic seller 
and the exp
fluctuates. However, exporters produce more output levels and consumers buy more 
exports in a country if the domestic seller and the exporter charge the same price and the 
price decreases as the exchange rate moves. 
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I illustrate the condition, which tells you whether the PTM exists or not. And we 
nd the relationship between PTM and the invoice currency that is different from 
ch; according to the model, if there is any PTM behavior by each firm, the 
firm pr
han they do in the buyer’s currency.  
hen I compare changes in the export price denominated in the exporter’s 
currenc
 
 
 
fi
existing resear
esents a more severe PTM between the domestic and the foreign market when it 
imposes the export price in terms of its own currency than it does in terms of the local- 
currency export price.  
The result about ERPT is consistent with other papers; there exists incomplete 
exchange rate pass-through to the export price and to the domestic price. However, 
exporters pass through more exchange-rate movements to the export price when they 
invoice the export price in its own currency t
W
y and changes in the price of the domestic good as the exchange rate varies, I find 
that the export price is more responsive to the exchange rate movements than the price of 
the domestic good in a country. 
In addition, the model allows us to find out some information about the trade 
balance; a country has a surplus in the trade balance if the country’s currency depreciates. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TWO-PERIOD MODEL 
two-period model does not have any intertemporal link between the first-period profit and 
the second-period profit. It is because the model has time-additively separable profit 
ecifications that are linear in the demand for the product at that point in time. 
How are their decisions different in the first period and the second period? The 
urpose of the two-period model is to answer the question. I will examine the role of 
iscount factors in the output level, the price, ERPT and PTM. Overall, I focus on 
owing the differences between the first-period and the second-period output level and 
the price. I also compare the second- f ERPT and PTM with those in the 
first period.    
4.1 Ass
rwise the 
model 
 
I extend the model in this chapter, developing a two-period version. However, this 
sp
p
d
sh
period condition o
  
umptions 
In the two-period model, I assume the following: (i) firms face a two-period time 
horizon to maximize their total profit in terms of its own currency; and (ii) firms have 
their own subjective discount factors that apply to the second period. Othe
setup is the same as the one-period setup. In other words, firm A may be more or 
less patient than firm B. If a firm has a low discount factor, the firm is impatient. It means 
that the firm prefers to get the value in the present rather than in the future. In contrast, if 
a firm has a high discount factor, the firm is patient.  
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Firms decide the best quantity (output level) and the price is determined by the 
output level separately in each period related to the exchange rate, unit cost and the 
discount factor they have at that time. Therefore first-period output level itself does not 
ffect on the second-period output level. This occurs because the output 
level i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
             
B AB ⎤⎦
⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
rrency as follows: 
have any direct e
s determined endogenously each period in the model economy. And, the 
endogenous output level has an effect on the price. 
 
4.2 Two-period Model 
Firm A maximizes the profits in terms of its own currency as follows: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2max  
A A AD B AB A A ADP q e P q P q e P qπ β ⎡= + + +⎣ 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 2
                
             
                
AD AD AB AB AD AD AB AB
AD BA AD BD AB AB
A AD BA
C q C q C q C q
a q q q e a q q q
a q qβ
− − − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − −
⎡+ − −⎣ 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2                                                        (61)
AD A BD AB AB
AD AD AB AB AD AD AB AB
q e a q q q
C q C q C q C q
β⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − −⎦ ⎣ ⎦
− − − −
 
 
Firm A maximizes the profits in terms of its own cu
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
             
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2
1 1max  
                
1           
                
B B BD A BA B B BD A BA
BD BD BA BA BD BD BA BA
BD AB BD AD BA BA
B BD
P q P q P q P q
e e
C q C q C q C q
a q q q a q q q
e
a q q
π β
β
⎡ ⎤= + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
− − − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
+ − −
  
2 2 2 2 2
2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1
                                                         (62)
AB BD B AD BA BA
BD BD BA BA BD BD BA BA
q a q q q
e
C q C q C q C q
β⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
− − − −
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where  ( ) indicates the price of the products that are sold in country  in the 
first period.  ( ) represents the price of the goods that are sold in country  in 
the second period. So the subscripts are the period of the time and the superscripts are the 
country designation. Let  (
1
iP ,i A B= i
2
iP ,i A B= i
1
iP ,i A B= ) and  (2iP ,i A B= ) be the inverse demand function 
of  ( ) and  (1
iQ ,i A B= 2iQ ,i A B= ), respectively.  is total quantity of the goods 
supplied by firm A and B to country  in each period. So we can rewrite the prices as 
follows and insert these prices into the equations (61) and (62) in order to get the second 
part of equations (61) and (62): 
 
                          (63)
                           (64) 
                           (65) 
                           (66) 
 
I assume that the demand curve, which each firm faces in both its domestic and 
ou ries. Ea  i poses a
e. Firm A c
iQ
i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1,  where ,  0
A A AD BA A AD BAP a Q a q q Q q q a= − = − − = + >   
2 2 2 2 2 2 2,  where ,  0
A A AD BA A AD BAP a Q a q q Q q q a= − = − − = + >
1 1 1 1 1 1 1,  where ,  0
B B BD AB B BD ABP a Q a q q Q q q a= − = − − = + >
2 2 2 2 2 2 2,  where ,  0
B B BD AB B BD ABP a Q a q q Q q q a= − = − − = + >
foreign market in each period, is a linear demand curve, and that consumers have the 
same preferences across c nt ch firm m  local-currency price as an export 
pric harges AP  in the domestic market in its own currency and BP  in the 
foreign market (country B) in country B’s currency. Firm B charges BP  in the domestic 
market in its own currency and AP  in the foreign market (country A) in country A’s 
currency. 
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Aβ  is the discount factor that firm A has in the second period and Bβ  is firm B’s 
discount factor in the second period. And, firms A and B have d rs 
so 
ifferent discount facto
Aβ  and Bβ  are not the same. We can define the discount facto
   
r as given:  
1 ,        is the discount rate in each country,     
1
                        , ,       ,     0 , 1 A B A Bi A B β β β β= ≠ < <
 
There is a negative relationship between the country’s discount factor and the 
discount rate. So if the country’s discount rate rises, the discount factor falls, and vice 
versa. In equations (61) and (62), if a firm has a low discount factor, the firm values the 
present revenue more than the future revenue. In other words, it discounts the future 
revenue h
i
i rr
β = +                              (67)                              
eavily. On the other hand, if a firm has a high discount factor, the firm 
discounts the second-period revenue lightly. With A Bβ β< , the firm A less patient 
since it values profits in the first period more than profits in the second period compared 
to firm B. Firm B values second-period profits more than firm A. Thus firm
is 
 B will be 
The nominal exchange rate is denoted by  and given exogenously. It represents 
the units of country A’s currency per unit of country B’s currenc
 
more patient to get the second-period revenue. 
e
y: 
'  
'  
e A s currency
B s currency
=                                                                                            (68) 
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The costs of production for each firm are expressed in terms of its own currency. 
The unit costs in each period are given as follows: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1,       ,       0
AT AD AD AB AB AD ABC C q C q C C C= + ≠ >                            (69) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2,       ,       , 0
AT AD AD AB AB AD AB AD ABC C q C q C C C C= + ≠ >                            (70) 
,       ,       , 0BT BD BD BA BA BD BA BD BAC C q C q C C C C= + ≠ >                              (71) 
BT BD BD BA BA BD BA= + ≠
1 1,
AD ABC
BD BAC C q C q C C C C >                              (72) 
                                               (73) 
                                              (74) 
                                                                                                           (75) 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2,       ,       , 0
1 1 1 1 1,        is constant and 0
AT BTC C C C C= = >
2 2 2 2 2,        is constant and 0
AT BTC C C C C= = >
1 2C C≠
The subscripts indicate the date, t  = 1, 2. In each period, C  is the unit cost to 
produce 
AD
ADq  and ABC  is the unit cost to produce ABq . The model assumes that  and 
 are d se selling the pr duct in a foreign countr  
transportations cost.  is the total cost to firm A to produce
ADC
ABC ifferent becau o y requires costs, such as
 ADq  and ABq . The un ATC it 
cost of  for firm B to produce  and  to produce e 
total cost to firm B to produce and . In the first period,
 are the same and I designate this as  In the  
and  are the same and given as . And I assume
From eq e 
 prices and output levels for countries A and B in each period. The first-order 
conditions with respect to 
BDC BDq BAC BAq  are different. BTC  is th
BDq  BAq  the total cost of ATC  and 
BTC 1C .  second period, the total cost of C
AT
BTC 2C  that 1C  and 2C  are different.  
uations (61) and (62), we take the first-order conditions in order to get th
equilibrium
ADq , ABq , BDq  and  in each period are respectively: BAq
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 1 10,                          1 1 1
1
2   
2 2
A BA AD
AD AD D a q Ca q C∂ −= − − = = −                (76) AAD qq
π
∂
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
2 0,             
2
A
2
BD AB
BD a q Cqπ∂ −AB AB ABAB e a q C qq e⎡ ⎤= − −− − = =⎣ ⎦∂                (77) 
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 0,           
A BA AD
A AD BA AD AD
AD Aa q q C q
π β a q C
q β
∂ −⎡ ⎤= − − − = = −⎣ ⎦∂               (78) 
2 2
2 2 2 2 22 0,       2 2
A BD AB AB AB
AB A
a q Ce a q q C q
q e
π β β
∂ −
2 2
A BD AB
⎡ ⎤= − = ) − − = −⎣ ⎦∂             (79
 
1 1
1 1 1
1 2 2
B AB BD
BD
a q C
q
π∂ −
∂ 2 0,                            
BD BD BDa q C q= − − = = −                 (80) 
1 1 11 0,             
B AD BA
AD BA BA a q e Ca q C qπ∂ −⎡= − = −             (81 1 1 1
1 1
2
2 2
BA
BA qq e
⎤− − =⎣ ⎦∂ 1) 
2 2
2 2 2 2
2
2 0,           
2 2
B AB BD
B BD AB BD BD
BD B
a q Ca q q C q
q
π β β
∂ −⎡ ⎤= − − − = = −⎣ ⎦∂               (82) 
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 2 0,       
2 2
B AD BA
B AD BA BA BA
BA B
a q e Ca q q C q
q e
π β β
∂ −⎡ ⎤= − − − = = −⎣ ⎦∂             (83)      
 
From the eight equations above, equilibrium quantities are derived for each firm 
in each period as follows: 
 
* *1 1 1
1 1 1
2 ,      if 2 ,     0
3 3 3
BA AD
AD BA AD ADa e C Cq a e C C= + − + > >1 1q                        (84) 
( )* *1 11 1 1
1
2 ,        if 2 ,     0
3 3 3
BD AB
AB BD AB ABa C Cq e a C C
e
= + − + > >1 1q                     (85) 
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( )* *2 2 22 2 22 ,     if 2 ,     2 23 3 3
BA AD
AD A B BA B AD AD
B A
a e C Cq a e C C qβ β ββ β= + − + > 0>      (86) 
( )* *2 22 2 2
2
2 ,     if 2 ,     2 23 3 3
BD AB
AB A B BD B AB AB
B A
a C Cq e a C C q
e
β β ββ β= + − + >
 
0>        (87) 
* *1 1
1 1 1 1
1
2 ,    if 2 ,   0
3 3 3
AB BD
BD AB BD BDa C Cq ae C e C
e
= + − + > >1 1q                            (88) 
* *1 1 12 ,   if 2 ,   0
3 3
AD BA
BA AD BA BAa C e Cq a C e C q= + − + > >                              (89) 1 1 1 1 13
( )* *2 22 2 2
2
2 ,  if 2 ,   0
3 3 3
AB BD
BD B A AB A BD BD
A B
a C C
2 2 2a e C e C qe
β β ββ β= + − + > >        (90) q
( )* *2 2 22 22 ,     if 2 ,   03 3 3
AD BA
BA B A AD A BA BA
A B
a C e Cq a Cβ β ββ β= + − + > >2 2 2e C q         (91) 
 
Both firms’ first-period output levels in the domestic and the foreign markets are 
the same as the one-period model in chapter 3. This occurs because firms deter e 
output level and the price separately in each period. Each period’s linear demand curve is 
not related to the other. In other words, when firms decide the first-period output level, 
second-period output level does not enter into the equilibrium condition. They decide the 
first-period output level based only on the first-period exchange rate and unit costs. And, 
in the second period, the firms consider the discount factors as well as the second-period 
exchange rate and the unit cost when they decide the output leve
The value of the first-period and the second-period revenue are not the same 
because of the time difference. So the discount factor alters the value of d-
period revenue into the first-period value. However, the first-period output level and the 
mine th
ls.  
the secon
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second-period output level are related to each other since firms have limited resources. 
More specifically, if firms want to increase one period’s output level, they should 
decrease the other period’s output level. There is a trade-off between the quantities in 
these two periods because resources they can use are limited.  
From equations (63), (84) and (89), and (64), (86) and (91), the equilibrium prices 
of the output that firms A and B charge for each period in country A in terms of country 
A’s currency are: 
 
* 1 1 1
1 3 3 3
BA ADa e C CAP = + +                                                                                   (92) 
* 2 2 2
BA AD
A a e C CP2 3 3 3B Aβ β                       (93) = + +                                                             
 
From equations (65), (85) and (88), and (66), (87) and (90) the equilibrium prices 
of the output that firms A and B charge in country B expressed in country B’s currency 
for each period are: 
 
* 1 1
1
13 3 3
AB BD
B a C CP = + +                                                       
e
                               (94) 
* 2 2
2 3 3 3
A
2
B BD
B
A BP e
a C C
β β= + +                                                                                  (95) 
 
The equilibrium prices of the product that firm A receives in each period from the 
foreign market (country B) expressed in country A’s currency are:  
 78
* 1 1 1
A
1
1 1 3 3 3
B BD
B ae C e Ce P = + +                                                                              (96) 
* 2 2 2 2
2 2 3 3 3
AB B
B
D
A B
ae C e Ce P β β= + +                                                                             (97) 
um prices of the output that firm B gets in each period from the 
foreign market (country A) in terms of country B’s currency are:  
 
 
The equilibri
*
1 1
1 13 3 3
1
1
A BA ADP a C C
e e e
= + +                                                                                   (98) 
*
2 2
2 23 3 3
A BA
B A
P a C C
e e β β= + +
2
2
AD
e
                                                                              (99) 
  
o-period setup. Each 
first-period’s quantity and price consists of the exchange rate, its own unit cost of 
production and the other firm’s cost of production. Note that
related to the other firm’s cost as well. In equation (92), for exam
 I derived the profit-maximizing quantities and prices in a tw
 the price and quantity are 
*Aple, 1P  is the price that 
*
1
AP  firms A and B charge in country A in terms of country A’s currency. Since 
represents both firms’ price in country A, it reflects both firms’ cost of production. And 
in the second-period, the price *2
AP  is discounted by both firms’ discount factor in 
equatio  (93). In the case of quantities, firms compete with each other in a market so they 
consider each other’s cost of the production when they choose their own quantity. Thus, 
we observe both firms’ unit cost
output levels are discounted by both firms’ discount factor as well.      
n
s in each output level. And that is why the second-period 
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 If the output level and the 
period, there should be certain relationships among these. That is what we will examine 
price are related to the discount factor in the second 
next.  
 
4.3 Output level and Discount Factor 
 How do changes in the discount factors affect the output levels? In this section, I 
report on the relationship between the output level and each firm’s discount factor. In 
equations (86), (87), (90) and (91), note that the size of a firm’s output level is affected 
not only by its own discount factor but also by the other firm’s discount factor.    
 
Proposition 8: Firm A’s domestic and foreign output levels are positively related to its 
own discount factor. Firm A’s domestic and foreign output levels are inversely related to 
firm B’s discount factor.  
  
Proof:    ( )2 2 2
2 0
AD AD
A
q C∂ = >                                                                          (100
3 Aβ β∂ ) 
              ( )2 2 22
2 0
3
AB AB
A A
q C
eβ β
∂ = >∂                                                                        (101) 
              ( )2 2 2 23 Bβ β∂ 0
AD BA
B
q e C∂ = − <                                                                        (102) 
              ( )2 2 2 03
AB BAq e C∂ = − <                                                                        (103) 
 
2B Bβ β∂
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Let us consider the effect of firm A’s discount factor on firm A’s domestic output 
level and the foreign output level. According to equations (100) and (101), there is a 
positive relationship between Aβ  and 2ADq  and between Aβ  and 2ABq . So, if firm A is 
more patient -- that is, Aβ  is higher -- then its domestic output level in the second period 
2
ADq ) rises. And, in this case, its export output level in country B ( 2
ABq( ) increases as well. 
In contrast, from equa s (  tion 102) and (103), Bβ , country B’s discount factor, has a 
negative impact on 2
ADq  and 2
ABq . Thus when firm B is m  A decreases 
both its domestic output level and its foreign output level.  
Firms share the customers in a market so if one firm sells more goods, the other 
firm sells fewer goods in the market. If firm  
patient, then firm B increases its second-period output level in country A. Thus, firm A’s 
second-period output level in the dom  
B increases its second-period output level in the domestic market. So, firm A’s second-
period output level in country
Next, I show that firm B has a similar relationship between the discount factor 
and the output level as shown below. 
 
ore patient, firm
 B’s discount factor increases and it is more
estic market decreases. Similarly, in this case, firm
 B decreases as well. That is why firm A’s domestic and 
foreign output levels are negatively related to firm B’s discount factor.  
Proposition 9: Firm B’s domestic and foreign output levels are positively related to its 
own discount factor. Firm B’s domestic and fore  output levels are inversely related to 
firm A’s discount factor.  
 
ign
 81
Proof:    ( )2 2
2 0
3
BD BD
B
q C
β β
∂ = >∂                                                                          (104) 2B
              ( )2 2 2
2
3
BA BA
B
q e C
β β
∂
∂ 2 0B = >                                                                           (105) 
              ( )2 223
BD AB
A A
q C
eβ β
∂ = − <∂ 2 0                                                                     (106) 
              ( )2 2
BA ADq C∂
2 0A = − <                                                                        (107) 
Equations (104) and (105) show that firm B’s discount factor (
3 Aβ β∂
 
Bβ ) is positively 
related to its own domestic output level and its export output level. And, equations (106) 
and (107) indicate that the exporter’s (firm A’s) discount factor ( Aβ ) is negatively 
related to firm B’s domestic output level and firm B’s output level in country A. 
Since the number of consumers in a market is limited, there is a trade-off between 
one fir t 
factor induces firm A to sell more goods in the domestic market in the second period, 
firm B sells fewer products in coun  
B because of its higher discount factor, firm B’s second-period output level in the 
domest  falls.      
Based on the relationship between the output levels and the discount factor that 
we fou t to compare the si - 
period output level to examine the effect of discount factor on the output level.  
 
m’s output level and the other firm’s output level. If firm A’s higher discoun
try A. And if firm A has more output level in country
ic market
nd, I wan ze of the first-period output level and the second
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Proposition 10: Suppose A Bβ β−  is positive and increases algebraically, then firm A’s 
second-period output level is greater than its first-period output level. 
 
Proof:    In the case of firm A’s domestic output level, 
* *1 1 12 ,      if 2 ,     0
BA AD
AD BA AD ADa e C Cq a e C C q= + − + > >                        (108) 1 1 1 1 13 3 3
( )* *2 2 22 2 2 2 22 ,     if 2 ,     03 3 3AD A B BA B AD ADB Aa e C Cq a e C C qβ β ββ β= + − + > >      (109) 
BA AD
( )2 2
2q C∂
2 0
3
AD AD
A Aβ β= >∂                                                                                         (110) 
( )2 2 2 2
q e C∂ 0
3
B Bβ β= − <∂                                                                                      (111) 
In the case of firm A’s foreign output level, 
AD BA
( )* *1 11 1 1
1
2 ,        if 2 ,     0
3 3 3
BD AB
AB BD AB ABa C Cq e a C C
e
= + − + > >1 1q                     (112) 
( )* *2 22 2 2 2 2,     if 2 ,     0ABB ACq e a C C qβ β β= + − + > >        (113) 
           
2
2
3 3 3
BD
AB A B BD B AB ABa C
eβ β
( )2 2 223e β
2 0
AB AB
A A
q C
β = >∂                                                                                       (114) 
∂
( )2 2 2 2 03
AB BA
B B
q e C
β β
∂ = − <∂                                                              
 
Let us start with firm A’s domestic output level. By comparing equations (108) 
and (109), we can show th . 
                        (115) 
at one period’s domestic output level is bigger than the other
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And firm A’s discount factor 
answer to the question. From equation (110), if firm A’s discount factor (
and firm B’s discount factor play important roles for the 
Aβ ) increases, 
firm A  second period are larger, resulting in 
its domestic output level in the second period. At the same time, in eq  
B’s discount factor (
 is more patient, so that output levels in the
uation (111), if firm
Bβ ) falls, firm B is less patient and prefers to sell the products in the 
first period in country A. So, firm A’s domestic output level rises in the second period as 
well in this case. As the result, A Bβ β−  is positive and increases. Aβ  and Bβ  make firm 
A’s domestic output level in the second period ( 2
ADq ) increase. Thus firm A’s second-
period domestic output level will be greater than the first-period output level.  
On the other hand, if firm A’s discount factor decreases in equation (110), firm A 
discounts the future more so it decreases its second-period domestic output level. And, if 
firm B has higher discount factor in equation (111), firm B discounts the future less and 
is patient to sell more exports in country A in the second period. Thus firm A’s domestic 
output level falls in the second period. As the result, Aβ  and Bβ  make firm A’s domestic 
output level in the second period ( 2
ADq ) decrease. Therefore, firm A’s second-period 
domestic output level will be smaller than the first-period output level. 
Other cases we have are as follows: First, firm A is more patient so it increases its 
domestic output level in the second period. And firm B is more patient as well, thus firm 
B increases the second-period output level in country A. Firm B’s higher discount factor 
means that firm A sells fewer goods in the domestic market the s nd period. 
Therefore, each 
in eco
Aβ  and Bβ  leads firm A’s domestic output level in the second period, 
2
ADq , to the opposite direction of the movement and we do not know wh  2
ADq  ether
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increases or decreases. We have ambiguous results and cannot say whether 2
ADq  is greater 
than or smaller than the first-period output level. Second, firm A discounts the future 
more so it decreases its second-period domestic output level. Firm B also discounts the 
future more so its second-period output level in country A falls. Thus, firm A’s second-
period domestic output level increases. Therefore, each Aβ  and Bβ  leads firm A’s 
domestic output level in the second period, 2
ADq , to the opposite direction of the 
movement and we do not know whether 2
ADq  increases or decreases. Thus annot say 
whethe
indi
 we c
r firm A’s domestic output level in the second period is greater than or smaller 
than its domestic output level in the first period. 
So far, we have investigated the size of firm A’s domestic output level in the first 
period and in the second period. Then, what will happen to firm A’s foreign output level 
in the second period? In the case of firm A’s foreign output level, equation (114) 
cates that if Aβ  rises -- firm A is more patient -- firm A’s second-period foreign 
output level ( 2
ABq ) rises. At the same time, equation (115) indicates that Bif β  falls -- 
firm B is less patient -- firm B prefers to sell more goods in the first period in its domestic 
market. So firm A’s second-period foreign output level rises. Therefore, firm A’s second-
period foreign output level will increase. As the result, firm A’s second-period foreign 
output level is greater than the first-period foreign output lev  
According to equations (114) and (115), 
el.
if Aβ  falls and Bβ  rises, 2ABq  falls. So 
firm A’s second-period foreign output level is smaller than the first-period output level. 
In other conditions of discount factors -- both firms’ discount factors move in the same 
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direction, we have ambiguous results since the movements of 2
ABq  related to Aβ  and Bβ  
are opposite directions.  
We have similar results for firm B’s first- and second-period output level. 
 
Proposition 11: Suppose B Aβ β−  is positive and increases algebraically, then firm B’s 
second-period output level is greater than its first-period output level.                  
 
Proof:    In the case of firm B’s domestic output level, 
* *1 12 ,    if 2 ,   
AB BD
BD AB BD BDa C Cq ae C e C q= + − + > >1 1 1 1 01 1
13 3 3e
                           (116) 
( )* *2 22 2 2 2 2 22 ,  if 2 ,   03 3 3BD B A AB A BD BDA Ba C Cq a e C e C qe β β ββ β2
AB BD
= + − + > >        (117) 
( )2 2 2 03B Bβ β= >∂                                                                                (118
2BD BDq C∂          ) 
( )2 2
q C∂
e of firm B’s foreign output level, 
2
2
0
3
A Aeβ β= − <∂                                                                                   (119) 
BD AB
In the cas
* *1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
2
3 3 3
ADa C ,   if 2 ,   0
BA
BA AD BA BAe Cq a C e C q= + − + > >                              (120) 
( )* *2 2 22 22 ,     if 2 ,   03 3 3
AD BA
BA B A AD A BA BA
A B
a C e C
2 2 2a C e C qβ β ββ β= + − + > >         (121) q
( )2 2 2 2
2 0
3
BA BA
B B
q e C
β β
∂ = >∂                                                                                          (122)
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( )2 2 2 03
BA AD
A A
q C
β β
∂ = − <∂                                                                                          
 
An increase in a discount factor means a firm discounts the future lightly so the 
firm is more patient to sell the  
the domestic market, if
        (123) 
product in the second period in a market, and vice versa. In
 Bβ  rises and Aβ  falls, for example,  rises in equations (118) 
and (119). S greater than the first-period 
domestic output level. In contrast, if 
2
BDq
o firm B’s second-period domestic output level is 
Bβ  falls and Aβ  rises, s 
(118) and (119). Hence firm B’s second-period domestic output level is smaller than the 
first-period output level. 
In the foreign market (country  
A has a lower discount factor, then firm B’s second-period foreign output level is greater 
irst-period output lev
A has a higher discount factor, firm B will sell a smaller number of goods in the foreign 
arket in the second period than in the first period.  In other conditions of discount 
factors
s is
one is larger. On the other hand, if the 
discount factors move in the same direction -- both firms are more patient or both firms 
2
BDq  falls from equation
 A), if firm B has a higher discount factor and firm
than the f el. However, if firm B has a lower discount factor and firm 
m
 -- both firms’ discount factors move in the same direction, we have ambiguous 
results. 
In this section, we examined how the changes in the discount factor affect the 
output levels. As the result, we found that if firm A’s discount factor and firm B’s 
discount factor move in opposite directions -- one of the firm  more patient but the 
other firm is less patient -- then we can compare the size of the output level in the first 
period and the second period and conclude which 
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are les
s (93) and (95),
s patient -- then we have ambiguous results about the size of the output levels in 
the second period. Thus we do not know whether the second-period output level is bigger 
or smaller than the first-period output level in these cases.       
  
4.4 The Price and Discount Factor 
Next, what is the effect of the discount factor on the price? According to 
equation  *2
AP  is affected by both firm A’s discount factor, Aβ , and firm 
B’s discount factor, Bβ , at the same time. Both Aβ  and Bβ  have influence on *BP  as 
well.  
 
2
AβProposition 12: (i) The local-currency price in country A is negatively related to  and 
Bβ ; (ii) The local-currency price in country B is negatively related to Aβ  and Bβ . 
  
 Proof:     2 2 2 03( )A A
P C
β β
∂ = − <∂                                                                        (124) 
A AD
         2 2 2 2 03( )
A BA
B B
P e C
β β
∂ = − <∂                                                                        (125) 
                            2 2 2
23 ( )
A Aeβ β∂
                
0= − <                                                                     (126) 
B ABP C∂
2 2
2
0
B BDP C∂ = − <                                                                     (127) 23 ( )B Beβ β∂
 
If we assume that exporters impose the export price in terms of buyer’s currency, 
firms A and B charge *2
AP  in country A in the second period and both firms charge *2
BP  
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in country B. In equations (124) and (125), firm A’s domestic price and firm B’s port 
e, *2
 ex
pric AP , and in equations (126) and (127), firm B’s domestic price a  firm A  end ’s xport 
eases when firm A and B are more patient -- firm A’s discount factor and 
. In othe
period price in country A when they are patient and want to sell more goods in the second 
o ila  in equations (126)  
ntry B when both firms are more patient. There is a trade-off between the 
and the quantity they s 
they should lower the price. If the discount factor is higher -- it implies that the firm is 
willing econd s 
we found in the equations above.     
 
ce?
price, *2
BP , decr
firm B’s discount factor rise r words, firms A and B will decrease the second-
peri rly,  and (127), both firms decrease the second-periodd. Sim
price in cou
price they charge can sell, therefore if firms want to sell more good
 to sell more goods in the s  period, then it lowers the price in each market a
Then, what kind of discount factors make the second-period price higher or lower 
than the first-period pri   
 
Proposition 13: Suppose both Aβ Bβ and  are higher, then the second-period prices in 
Proof:    in country A,   
country A and B are lower than the first-period prices. 
 
* 1 1 1
1 3 3 3
AP = + +                                 (128) 
BA ADa e C C
                                                  * 2 2 22 3 3 3
BA AD
B A
a e C CAP β β
                                        
= + +                                 (129) 
2 2 0
3( )
A ADP C
β β
∂
2A A= − <∂                                      (130) 
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                                      2 2 2 0
A BAP e C∂
23( )B Bβ β= − <∂                                      (131) 
               in country B,  * 1 11
13 3 3
AB BD
B a C CP = + +                                    (132)     
e
                       
                                      * 2 22
23 3 3
AB B
B
D
A B
a C CP
eβ β= + +                                (133)                           
                                                   2 2 2
23 (
AB
A Aeβ β 0)
BP C∂ = − <                                  (134) 
                                                   
∂
2 2
2
2
0
3 ( )
B BD
B B
P C
eβ β
∂ = − <∂                                  (135) 
 
, the prices in countries A and B are dependent on 
both 
From equations (129) and (133)
Aβ  and Bβ . If firms A and B are more patient -- both Aβ  and Bβ  rise -- then both 
firms lower th omestic and the fo r 
profits. Hence, the second-period prices in both markets are lower than the first-period 
prices. And if firms A and B are less patient -- both 
e future price in the d reign market to obtain highe
Aβ B and β  falls -- then both firms 
increase the future price. Thus, the second-period price is
price in both markets.    
 
4.5 Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
hrough in the second 
 
         
 higher than the first-period 
Is there any exchange rate pass t period? 
*
2 2 2 2 2 2
*
2 2 2 2 22 2 2
1
3
3 3 3
A BA A BA
A B A B A BA B ADBA AD
B A
P e C e e C
e P a e C Ca e C C
β
β β β β
β β
∂ × = × = <∂ +⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
β+     (136) 
 90
Suppose that exporters charge the export price in terms of the buyer’s currency. 
Firm A impos *2es 
AP  in the domestic market and firm B charges *2
AP  country A as the 
export price in the second period. We take the exchange-rate elasticity of the price in the 
second period as shown above in equation (136) to investigate the degree of ERPT in 
country A. It is less than 1 and indicates that there is an incomplete ERPT in the country. 
Less than 1 for the elasticity also means that the percentage change in the price in country 
A is less than the percen
 in
tage change in the exchange rate. So firms A and B do not pass 
through the full proportion of the exchange-rate movements into the domestic price in the 
 price in the case of firm B. This result is the same as 
the resu de that firms do not 
pass through the exchange rate movement into the prices even though they have an 
extended time horizon.    
We can also measure the ERPT for country B in the second period as follows:  
 
case of firm A and into the export
lt of ERPT we had in the one-period model. Thus we conclu
*
2 2 2 2
*
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
3
                 1
B AB
B A AB BD
B AB
A B B AB A BD
e P e a C C
a e C e C
β
β β β β
× = − ×⎜ ⎟∂ ⎛ ⎞
2
3 3 3A B
P e C e
e
C
β β
β
⎛ ⎞∂
⎝ ⎠ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= − <+ +
                                         (137) 
 
*BP  is the local-currency price that firms A and B charge in the second period in 
country B. Equation (137) is the exchange-rate elasticity of the price in country B in the 
second period. It shows the relative price changes as the exchange rate varies. The 
exchange-rate elasticity of the price in country B is incomplete as well since it is less than 
2
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1. It implies that firms A and B pass through only part of the exchange rate movements 
into the price in the country. In conclusion, the firms exhibit incomplete ERPT in both 
market
the tim s have does not make any differences in firm’s ERPT behavior.  
Furthermore, do the firms show the incomplete ERPT behaviors when they set the 
export price in their own currency as well? Suppose that exporters impose the export 
price in terms of its own currency, the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A’s export price 
that is expressed in its own currency as given below. Firm A’s exchange-rate pass 
through is incomplete: 
 
s not only in the first period but also in the second period. Therefore, the length of 
e period that firm
( )
*
2 2 2 2
*
2 2
1
3 3
3 3 3
                        1
AB BDB B
A B
A B B AB A BD
e P e a C
ae C e Ce e P
a e C e C
β
β β
β β β β
⎛ ⎞
∂ ⎜ ⎟× = + ×⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟2 2 2 22 2 2
2 2 2 2
B BD
A B BDe a Cβ β
⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞
⎝ ⎠ + +⎜ ⎟
+
⎝ ⎠
= <+ +
 
The exchange-rate elasticity of firm B’s export price that is expressed by its own 
currency is as follows. The exchange-rate pass through is incomplete: 
 
                                   (138) 
( )
*
2
2
2 2*
2 2 22 2 2
2 2
3 3
AD
AA BA AD
B A
e e a C e
e e eP a C Cβ
∂⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠
∂ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠
2 2 2
2
2
2 2 2
3 3 3
1
A
B A AD
A B A BA A AD
P
e e e
a C
a e C C
β β
β β
β β β β
⎛ ⎞
× = − − ×⎜ ⎟
+ +
                            
⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
+= − <+ +
⎜ ⎟                       (139) 
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Then, can we tell the difference in the degree of ERPT when the firms have a 
different choice of invoice currency? We find more implications about the exporter’s 
invoice choice and the ERPT as follows. 
 
Proposition 14: The degree of ERPT in the second period is higher when the exporter 
invoices in its own currency than in the buyer’s currency. 
 
Proof:     
Firm A 
( )
*
2 2 2
*
2 2 2 2 2 2
*
2 22 2 2
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
           
B B AB
B A B B AB A BD
A B BDB
B A B B AB A B
P e C
e P a e C e C
e a Ce P e
e e P a e C e C
β
β β β β
β β
β β β β
⎧ ⎫∂⎪ ⎪× = −⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫+∂⎪ ⎪< × =⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
                       (140) 
D
Firm B 
( )
*
*
2 2 2 2 2
*
2
A A BA
A A B A BA B AD
A
e P a e C C
P
β β β β
⎧ ⎫× =⎨ ⎬∂ + +
2 2 2 2
22 2
*
2 2 2 22
         
B A AD
A B A BA A ADA
P e e C
a Ce e
e a e C CP
β
β β
β β β β
∂
⎩
2e⎪ ⎪
⎭
⎫⎪+⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠< × = −⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟
⎧ ⎛ ⎞∂⎪ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
                    (141) 
 is the second-period price in country B charged by firms A and B. It is in 
terms of country B’s currency. So, in this case, firm A imposes the export price expressed 
in the buyers’ currency in country B.  is the price that firm A charges in country B 
expressed in its own currency. The first equation in inequality (140) represents ERPT 
⎩ ⎭
 
*
2
BP
*
2 2
Be P
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*
2
APwhen firm A invoices in buyer’s currency to sell the exports in country B.  is the 
price in country B charged by firms A and B. It is in terms of country A’s currency. 
*
2
2
AP
e
 
is the price that firm B charges in country A expressed in its own currency. 
m A, we derive inequality (140) from equations (137) and (138). 
Firm A’s exchange rate pass-through to the export price in the second period when the 
export price is measured by its own currency, 
In the case of fir
( )2 2
2 2 2
A B BD
A B B AB
2
e a C
a e C e C
β β
β β β
+
+ + r 
than the exchange rate pass-through to the export price when the export price is expressed 
by the buyer’s currency,
A BDβ , is greate
2
2 2 2 2
B AB
A B B AB A B
C
a e C e C
β
β β β β− + + D . It is true because of the 
condition in equation (87). If ( )2 2 2
2 0q >  then ( )2 2  A’s degree of ERPT is 
higher when it sets the export price in its own currency rather than in the buyer’s 
currency. 
the second period. Firm B’s exchange rate pass-through to the export price when the 
export price is measured by its own currency, 
2A B BD Be a C Cβ β β+ > AB  is binding in order to get 
AB
2
AB  is true. Thus, firm
We have inequality (141) based on equations (136), (139) and (91) for firm B in 
* A B BD Be a C Cβ β β+ >
( )2B A ADa Cβ β +−
2 2 2a e C Cβ β β β+ +
than the ERPT to the local-currency export price, 
A B A BA A AD , is greater 
2 2
A BA
A
2 2 2
B A BA B ADa e C Cβ β β β+ +
because firm B has the condition of 
e Cβ . This is 
( )2 22   2AD A BAa C e Cβ β β+ >  in equation (91) in B A
order to get more than zero quantity of the good in country A in the second period 
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( *2 0
BAq > ). If (B Aaβ β )2 22   2AD A BAC e Cβ+ > or ( )2 2 2  A BAa C e Cβ+ > from 
equation (91) then the inequali
2
B A ADβ β
ty, ( )2 2 2BA , is valid. Therefore we 
 the second period is higher when it sets the 
export price in its own currency rather than in the buyer’s currency. Hence we have the 
same result about the E
B A AD Aa C e Cβ β β+ >
 B’s degree of ERPT in
RPT in the second period as we have in the one-period model.  
 
 
conclude that firm
Do firms have different degrees of ERPT in the first period and the second period 
because of the discount factors they have in the second period? 
Proposition 15: The degree of ERPT in the secon st period. 
Proof:     In country A, 
d period is higher than the fir
 
*
2 2 2 2
*A A B A BA B
P e e C
e P a e C
β
β β β β
⎧ ⎫∂ × =⎨ ⎬
2 2 2 2 2
A A BA
ADC∂ +⎩ ⎭
 
    
+
>  
*
2 2
A BA⎧ ⎫2 2 2 2
*
2 2 2
A BA
P e e C
e P a e C Cβ
∂ × =⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎩ ⎭
 >  
*A BA
AD
1 1 1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1
A BA AD
P e e C
e P a e C C
⎧ ⎫∂ × =⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎩ ⎭
          (142) 
In country B, 
*
*
2 2 2 2 2 2
B B AB
B A B B AB A BDe P a e C e C
β
β β β β
⎧ ⎫∂ 2 2 2P e C⎪ ⎪× = −⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎭
 
⎩
>  
*
2 2 2
*
2 2 2 2 2 2
B AB
B AB BD
P e C
e P a e C e Cβ
⎧ ⎫∂⎪ ⎪× = −⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 >  
*
1 1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1 1
B AB
B AB BD
P e C
e P ae C e C
⎧ ⎫∂⎪ ⎪× = −⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
  (143) 
e in the first period and in 
e second period to get the pure effect of discount factors on ERPT in the comparison. 
 
 Suppose that the exchange rate and the costs are the sam
th
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Suppose that exporters invoice in the buyer’s currency as the export price in each country 
s well.  In equation (67), we have an assumption, 0 , 1A Bβ β< <a . And if we multiply a 
number that is greater than zero but less than one, we have a 
smaller number after the multiplication. If we have a smaller number for the 
denominator, we have a bigger value of a fraction. Therefore, in inequality (142), 
constant number by a 
 
2 2
2 2 2
A BA
A B A BA B A
e C
a e C
β
β β β β+ + DC  has the biggest number, indicating that firms in country A 
he most exchange rate fluctuations to the price when they have a different 
discount factor for each firm in the second period (
pass through t
A Bβ β≠ ). We have 
2 2
2 2 2
BA
BA AD
e C
a e C Cβ + +
firms in the second period (
 when we suppose that firms have the same discount factor for the 
A Bβ β= ). In this case, the ERPT is higher than the first-
period ERPT but lower than the case of different discount factors. 1 1
1 1 1
BA ADa e C C+ +  has a 
lowest value indicating that firms have the lowest ERPT if they have only one period to 
consider.  
In conclusion, exporters pass through more te changes when they 
have longer time periods and different discount factors than they do when they have only 
one-period to consider. The same is true in the case of country B in inequality (143). 
 
second period of the two-period model? Are there any differences in the firms’ PTM 
behaviors if they have more time horizon to consider? 
BAe C
 exchange ra
4.6 On PTM 
What are the conditions that indicate the existence of PTM in the case of the 
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4.6.1 Firm A’s Local-Currency Export 
When firm A imposes local-currency export price in country B, we have the 
e the rel
 
Price vs. Firm A’s Domestic Price 
following equation to measur ative price change in the domestic and the foreign 
market as the exchange rate moves in the second period: 
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A's local-currency export price in country B
*
*
2 2 2 22 2
2 2
*
2 2
B ABB
A B B AB A BDB
A
CP e
a e C e Ce P
e P
β
β β β β
⎛∂
+ +∂ ⎝= =
×∂
22 2
*
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm A's domestic price
AP e
−×
∂ 2 2
2 2 2
A B A BA B ADa e C Cβ β β β
⎞
⎠
⎜ ⎟
( )( )
( )( )
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
                  
                              (144)
A BA
B AB A B A BA B AD
A BA A B B AB A BD
e C
C a e C C
e C a e C e C
β
β β β β β
β β β β β
⎜ ⎟
⎛ ⎞
+ +
⎧ ⎫+ +⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
                 
⎝ ⎠
     
         
If 
( )( )
( )( )
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1,
B AB A B A BA B ADC a e C Cβ β β β β+ +− =  the relative price changes in the 
A BA A B B AB A BDe C a e C e Cβ β β β β+ +
es. Therefore, 
there is                       
foreign and the domestic market are the same as the exchange rate mov
 no PTM in the second period.                                                                        (145)      
If 
( )( )
( )( )
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1,
B AB A B A BA B ADC a e C C
e C a e C e C
β β β β β
β β β β β
+ +− >+ +  or     A BA A B B AB A BD
    
( )( )
( )( )
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1,
B AB A B A BA B AD
A BA A B B AB A BD
C a e C C
e C a e C e C
β β β β β
β β β β β
+ +− <+ +  there are relative price differences in 
the foreign and the domestic market. Thus, PTM occurs by firm A in the second period. 
                                                                                                                                   (146)                            
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4.6.2 Firm B’s Local-Currency Export Price vs. Firm B’s Domestic Price 
When firm B imposes local-currency export price in country A, we have the 
following equation to measure the relative price change in the domestic and the foreign 
market as the exchange rate moves in the second period: 
 
*
2 22 2
*
2 2 22 2
*
2 2
*
2 2
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm B's local-currency export price in country A
the exchange-rate elasticity of firm B's domestic price
A BAA
A B A BA B ADA
B
B
e CP e
a e C Ce P
P e
e P
β
β β β β
⎛∂ × ⎜ + +∂ ⎝= =∂ ×∂
( )( )
( )( )
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
B AB
A B B AB A BD
B AB A B A BA B AD
C
a e C e C
C a e C C
β
β β β β
β β β β β
⎞⎟
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
                
If 
2 2 2 2 2 2
                  
                                       (147)
A BA A B B AB A BDe C a e C e Cβ β β β β
⎠
⎧ ⎫+ +⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬
      
( )( )
( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1,
A BA A B B AB A BD
B AB A B A BA B AD
e C a e C e C
C a e C C
β β β β β
β β β β β
+ +− =+ +  the relative price changes in the 
eign and the domestic market are the same as 
               
for the exchange rate varies. Therefore, 
there is no PTM in the second period.                                                                        (148)             
If 
( )( )
( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 1,
A BA A B B AB A BDe C a e C e Cβ β β β β+ +− >  or     
2 2 2 2
B AB A B A BA B ADC a e C Cβ β β β β+ +
    
( )( )
( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 1,
A BA A B B AB A BDe C a e C e Cβ β β β β+ +− <  there are relative price differences in 
2 2 2 2
B AB A B A BA B ADC a e C Cβ β β β β+ +
                      
                                        (149)                            
 
the foreign and the domestic market. Thus, PTM occurs by firm B in the second period.      
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Then, what is the effect of discount factors on PTM? Do we have a different 
degree of PTM between the first period and the second period?  
 
( )( )
( )( )
*
2 2
*
2 2 22 2
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
*
2 2
B
B AB A B A BA B ADB
A A BA A B B AB A BD
A
P e
C a e C Ce P
P e e C a e C e C
e P
β β β β β
β β β β β
∂ × ⎧ ⎫+ +∂ ⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭×∂
2                      (150) 
( )
( )( )
*
2 2
*
2 2 2 22 2
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
*
2 2
B
AB BA ADB
A BA AB BD
A
P e
C a e C Ce P
P e e C a e C e C
e P
β
β
∂ × ⎧ ⎫+ +∂ ⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭×∂
                                          (151) 
( )
( )( )
*
*
1 1
B
A BA AB BD
P e∂ 1 1
*
1 1 1 11 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
*
AB BA ADB
A
C a e C Ce P
P e e C ae C e C
e P
× ⎧ ⎫+ +∂ ⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬
 
In the case of firm A, if we assume that exporters have local-currency export price 
s have different discount factors, we have equation (150) as the standard to 
determine the existence of PTM. On the other hand, if we assume that firms A and B 
∂ + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭×∂
                                              (152) 
and firm
have the same discount factor ( A Bβ β= ), we have equation (151) as the condition of the 
existence of PTM. And equation (152) is the condition of PTM existence when firm A 
has only one period.  
. We cannot tell whether 
exporters show a more severe PTM when they have extended time period or not. The 
same is true in the case of firm B. 
We cannot determine which case has a relatively higher degree of PTM. 
Therefore, the effect of discount factors on PTM is indeterminate
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4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, I establish a two-period model but it does not have any 
intertemporal links. The intertemporal aspects are negated by the fact that the model has 
time-additively separable profit specifications that are linear in the demand for the 
product at that point in time. I have focused on investi  
first-period and the second-period output level decisions and the equilibrium prices as the 
exchange rate moves. A firm’s output level, price, ERPT and PTM are affected by both 
its own discount factor and the other firm’s discount factor. I address the condition of 
discount factors that make the second-period output level and the price higher than the 
first-period output level and price. If one firm’s discount factor is high but the other 
firm’s 
   
at ERPT in the second period is incomplete as well as in the first 
period.
of PTM in the second period as well. Each firm’s 
 is multiplied by every cost and the exchange rate in the numerator and the 
denomi
gating the difference between the
discount factor is low -- one firm is more patient and discounts the future lightly 
but the other firm is less patient and discounts the future heavily, then the more patient 
firm’s second-period output level in both domestic and the foreign market is greater than 
its first-period output level. However, when both firms are more patient, the second-
period prices in the domestic and the foreign market are lower than the first-period price.    
I concluded th
 However, I found that firms pass through more exchange rate movements to the 
price when they have more time horizon to consider; second-period ERPT is higher than 
the first-period ERPT.  
I presented the condition 
discount factor
nator of the condition. Thus the influence of the discount factor on PTM is 
ambiguous. We also cannot show the effect of extended time period on PTM behavior.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
A clear definition of PTM is important. It helps in measurement of PTM and in 
the development of empirical work related to PTM. This paper clarifies the situation that 
we call PTM based on Krugman’s (1987) initial idea. PTM in this dissertation focuses on 
the relative movements of the export price in different markets, conditional on exchange 
rate movements. An interesting feature is that the degree of ERPT itself is not important 
to determine the existence of PTM. But the relative degree of ERPT in different markets 
is crucial to conclude whether there is PTM behavior or not.  
The advantage of the model in this dissertation is as follows: First, the model 
takes the output level as the motivation of firms’ PTM behavior. Thus output level is 
determined in the m
xport prices vary according to the exchange rate changes. 
That m
 
PTM I presented in this dissertatio dard formalizes the conception of 
PTM. It is a ratio of the exchan a country’s export price to the 
xchange-rate elasticity of the domestic price using the export and domestic prices 
odel to maximize the profit rather than take it as given (Froot and 
Klemperer, 1989). Second, in the model developed in this dissertation, both equilibrium 
domestic price and export price depend on the exchange rate as well as the cost of 
production, rather than only e
akes it possible to obtain the exchange-rate elasticity of domestic price and the 
exchange-rate elasticity of export price directly. Therefore, it is also possible to directly 
measure the relative price changes as the exchange rate varies in the different markets.  
I present a standard to identify the existence of PTM based on the definition of
n. Thus the stan
ge-rate elasticity of 
e
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determ
hetta and Wincoop, 2002), 
and be
ined in the model. The ratio provides a better measure of the relative price 
movements in the foreign market and the domestic market as the exchange rate 
fluctuates. This is because the elasticity of the export price, or that of the domestic price 
with respect to the exchange rate changes, measures the percentage changes of the prices 
in response to the percentage changes of the exchange rates.  
I report a different result compared to existing research in terms of the 
relationship between the invoice currency and ERPT (Bacc
tween the invoice currency and PTM (Gil-Pareja, 2003 and Bleaney, 1997). I 
found that exporters pass through more exchange-rate movements to the export price 
when they invoice the export price in their own currency than they do in the buyers’ 
currency. The relative price difference between the domestic and the foreign market is 
larger -- higher degree of PTM when they invoice the export price in their own currency 
than they do in the buyers’ currency. However, my finding is similar to the findings in 
other literature on the degree of ERPT (Frankel, Parsley and Wei, 2005; Lee, 1997; 
Menon, 1996; Gron and Swenson, 1996; Hooper and Mann, 1989; Froot and Klemperer, 
1989 and Krugman, 1987): an incomplete ERPT is prevalent in the markets. 
In my comparison of changes in the export price denominated in the exporter’s 
currency and changes in the price of the domestic good as the exchange rate varies, I 
found that the export price is more responsive to the exchange rate movements than the 
price of the domestic good in a country.  
In addition, I found that domestic producers produce more output levels and 
consumers buy more domestic goods in a country if the domestic seller and the exporter 
charge the same price and the price increases as the exchange rate fluctuates. However, 
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exporters produce more output levels and consumers buy more exports in a country if the 
domestic seller and the exporter charge the same price and the price decreases as the 
exchan
 patient and 
discoun
 the domestic and the foreign market are lower 
than th
ge rate moves. 
I also show that if a country’s currency depreciates, the country has a surplus in 
the trade balance with the other country. On the other hand, if a country’s currency 
appreciates, we have an indeterminate result in the country’s trade balance with the other 
country. In this way, I extended Magee’s (1973) and Kreinin’s (1977) work.  
Using the two-period model, I tried to examine the effect of extended time period 
on the output level, the price, ERPT and PTM. A firm’s output level, price, ERPT and 
PTM are affected by both its own discount factor and the other firm’s discount factor. I 
address the conditions of each firm’s discount factor that entail a higher future output 
level and higher price than the present output level and price. If one firm’s discount factor 
is high but the other firm’s discount factor is low -- one firm is more
ts the future lightly but the other firm is less patient and discounts the future 
heavily, then the more patient firm’s second-period output level in both domestic and the 
foreign market is greater than its first-period output level. However, when both firms are 
more patient, the second-period prices in
e first-period price. 
Furthermore, I concluded that an incomplete ERPT is prevalent when the firms 
have extended time period as well as they have only one period. I found, however, that 
firms pass through more exchange rate movements to the price when they have more time 
horizon to consider; second-period ERPT is higher than the first-period ERPT. On the 
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other h
 
cost fun
          
 
 
 
and, the effect of the extended time period on the PTM behavior is indeterminate 
in the model economy.  
Further study should focus on developing a general model showing the conditions 
of PTM existence without limiting the model’s results within certain demand curves or
ctions. In addition, it will be interesting to study a generalized two-period model 
in which the intertemporal link between the first-period profit and the second-period 
profit exists. The empirical work to test the model will also be valuable.  
This dissertation accepts the exchange rate as given and does not consider the 
exporter’s expectation of the exchange rate movements in the future as a variable. 
However, an analysis that includes the expectation factor into the model could provide 
useful implications to the exchange-rate policy. It will also be valuable to set up a model 
with heterogeneous goods so that we could focus on firms on operating in an economy in 
which Bertrand price competition exists. Then the firms choose prices directly. 
Furthermore, investigating the effect of trade policy on exporter’s PTM behavior will be 
interesting.    
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